




the Faculty of the Department of Economics
University of Houston
In Partial Fulfillment






This paper substantially benefited from the guidance and 
constructive criticism of the members of my dissertation committee 
for which I am indebted. I am also grateful for the support and 
patience of my wife, Adette.
LIFE INSURANCE
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
An Abstract of a Dissertation
Presented to
the Faculty of the Department of Economics
University of Houston
In Partial Fulfillment







Based on the institutional and economic environment in which life 
insurance companies operate, this study develops a theoretical portfolio 
model with sufficient empirical content to yield hypotheses about life 
insurance portfolio behavior which are readily tested with appropriate 
econometric techniques.
State quantitative and qualitative restrictions on portfolio com­
position, the accounting procedures promulgated by the National Associa­
tion of Insurance Commissioners, Federal tax laws, and other taxes and 
regulations provide the institutional setting for the life insurance 
investment process. Given these, the solvency of a life insurance com­
pany is affected by the riskiness of its investment portfolio, the un­
certainty of future operating expenses, and the uncertainty of cash 
flows between the policyholder and the company. This study focuses on 
the first of these sources of risk and abstracts away from the other 
two.
A simple chance-constrained model is presented which integrates 
the basic economic variables relevant to life insurance company portfolio 
management. In this model, the firm's objective is to maximize its rate 
of return on its portfolio subject to a probabalistic solvency constraint, 
legal constraints, a balance sheet constraint, and non-negativity con­
straints. Given parameters for the model, the optimal portfolio may be 
specified, and a sensitivity analysis to parameter changes provides the 
basis for several testable hypotheses.
Several significant economic relationships were found using an 
econometric analysis of a cross-sectional/time series panel of 92 large 
U.S. life insurance companies over the 1957-71 time period. The amount 
of surplus and a proxy for the level of financial yields were positively 
related to investments in equities and negatively related to investments 
in bonds and mortgages.
Company size was positively related to the proportion of assets 
invested in common stock and bonds and inversely related to the propor­
tional investment in mortgages. Distributed lag models showed the res­
ponse to changes in independent variables to be fairly rapid, with the 
demand for bonds and common stock possessing the highest adjustment rates 
and changes in the amount of surplus causing the most rapid responses.
While New York regulated companies generally invest in less common 
stock, this result is largely explained by the economic differences 
between New York licensed companies and other companies. Stock companies 
invested in more conservative portfolios than mutuals, given the inde­
pendent variables: this result is expected because of the differences 
in the life insurance products sold by the two types of firms. Consid­
erable unexplained interfirm variation persisted, perhaps because the 
high substitutability among financial assets makes prediction difficult.
Relative yields often did not prove to be significant determinants 
of portfolio choices. These results may be due to the problems of multi­
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collinearity, autocorrelation, and sample size, but the poor performance 
of yields may have other bases, as well. In the chance constrained model, 
the demand for a security is a complex function and, conceptually, the 
demand for a security may be inversely related to its own yield. The 
demand for a security will be inelastic with respect to yield changes 
when upper or lower bound constraints are binding. In addition, the nor­
mative significance of relative yields may be questionable if yield 
changes occur in response to other characteristics of securities such as 
maturity, liquidity, and risk of default when these other features are 
not explicitly accounted for in the model.
This study of life insurance portfolio behavior deals with, a num­
ber of important theoretical and empirical problems. While the empir­
ical results generally conform to expectations derived from an analy­
tical model, much portfolio variation remains unexplained. At the same 
time, however, much portfolio variation among the large life insurance 
companies in this study does appear to have a rational economic basis.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental assumption of microeconomic theory is 
that economic units are engaged in some optimization process. 
For example, consumers are assumed to maximize their satis­
faction while firms maximize their profits or their wealth. 
These assumptions lead directly to empirically testable hy­
potheses concerning the behavior of the economic unit. The 
application of the optimization process to the behavior of 
life insurance company portfolios poses a number of impor­
tant empirical and theoretical problems.
In order to provide a perspective for studying a 
financial intermediary such as life insurance companies, it 
is worthwhile to contrast the properties of tangible and fin­
ancial assets.^ Tangible assets are highly specialized in 
form and use, are held primarily for the physical services 
they yield directly, are highly illiquid, are highly comple­
mentary, and are characterized by externalities in use. In 
comparison, financial assets are generalized, income-earning 
claims on future production, are highly substitutable, and are 
much more liquid. It follows from these characteristics that
^Basil J. Moore, An Introduction to the Theory of 
Finance: Assetholder Behavior Under Uncertainty (New York: 
The Free Press, 1968), pp. 11-2.
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financial markets should possess more allocational and oper­
ational efficiency than real markets; financial markets 
should commit scarce resources to those alternative uses 
promising the highest rates of return and at low transactions 
costs more readily than real markets.
Life insurance companies are financial intermed­
iaries that obtain loanable funds from their policyholders 
and invest them in a broad range of capital market securi­
ties. Life insurance companies are complex organizations 
whose behavior cannot be explained by a simple, unidimension­
al goal such as pure profit-maximization because the manage­
ment of a life insurance company must deal with tradeoffs 
between the yield on its portfolio and its maturity struc­
ture, liquidity, and risk. The purpose of this study is to 
build a model of efficient portfolio choices available to 
life insurance companies, given both the economic and insti­
tutional frameworks in which they operate, and to test em­
pirically hypotheses derived from this model. This requires 
an integration of the economic significance of the contrac­
tual obligations between insurance companies and policy- 
holders into a model of portfolio choice relevant to the 
life insurance industry.
Chapter II provides the economic and institutional 
background upon which the conceptual model and the empirical 
analysis of this study depend. Since investment decisions 
are made under risky conditions, the basic sources of risk 
to life insurance companies are analyzed. The net cash flows
3 
between the life company and its policyholders are uncertain
because of the uncertainty of mortality predictions and be­
cause many options about the disposal of a policy are made 
at the discretion of the policyholder. Investment net cash 
flows are necessarily risky because of the basic riskiness 
of the securities purchased. Future operating expenses are 
uncertain due to inflation and changing technology. The im­
pacts of the tax and regulatory environment affecting life 
insurance investment choices are embodied in Federal income 
taxes, the valuation procedures of the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners, state qualitative and quantita­
tive restrictions on portfolio composition, and other taxes 
and regulations.
In Chapter II, a chance-constrained model is devel­
oped in which a life company’s objective is to maximize its 
rate of return on assets subject to the constraint that it 
has a high probability of remaining solvent and also subject 
to legal, non-negativity, and balance sheet constraints. 
According to the model, a life company’s capacity to under­
take risks and probably remain solvent is positively related 
to the company's amount of surplus and its rate of return on 
assets and negatively related to the rate the company pays 
on its liabilities. An increase in a company’s risk-taking 
capacity (through a change in the above), a relaxation of a 
binding legal constraint on a risky asset, or a decrease in 
management’s degree of risk-aversion should result in a 
portfolio shift towards relatively riskier types of
u
securities.
Chapter IV empirically tests some of the economic 
relationships derived from the chance-constrained model of 
Chapter III. The statistical base is a cross-section/time- 
series panel of 104 large life insurance companies over 15 
years from 1957-1971. The basic results obtained from ordi­
nary least squares models and analysis of covariance tech­
niques generally confirm the hypotheses obtained from the 
chance-constrained model. These results are extended by 
using a technique to remove first-order autocorrelation and 
by applying the Koyck and the Almon distributed lag models 
to explore the dynamic properties of the portfolio adjust­
ment process.
In Chapter V, a summation of the material discussed 
in preceding chapters is presented and conclusions drawn on 
the basis of that information are reviewed. The performance 
of the life insurance industry is an economic concern not 
only to the companies and their regulators, but to policy- 
holders and the capital markets in general. In addition to 
the conclusions specific to the life insurance industry, 
some conceptual and empirical results have significant impli­
cations for financial research in other areas.
CHAPTER II
THE LIFE INSURANCE 
INVESTMENT PROCESS
In Chapter II, we consider the econortic and insti­
tutional factors that affect the investment decisions of 
life insurance companies. Because a company's mortality 
experience, its operating expenses, and its investment 
performance are uncertain, the life insurance company is 
making decisions under risk, with the last of the three 
sources of risk above chosen as the focus of this study. 
In addition, the tax and regulatory environment of the 
industry ordain many of the characteristics of the frame­
work in which life insurance companies optimize.
Rational economic behavior must be consistent with 
basic objectives. In order to evaluate this behavior, 
goals must be made explicit, resources, constraints, and 
economic relationships must be recognized, and economic 
performance must be measured. Inconsistent behavior is 
demonstrated by life insurance companies when they exhibit 
wide variances in holdings of certain capital securities. 
Such behavior must be explained by disagreement about 
basic investment goals, by different economic environments 
or by ineptitude of portfolio managers.
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Differences over basic objectives undoubtedly 
exist, as suggested by Wehrle who summarizes three views 
of life insurance investment.The first, which he calls 
the capital security portfolio, places primary emphasis 
on safety and minimization of default risk, secondary 
emphasis on high yields and even less emphasis on liquid­
ity. In a second view, the income security portfolio, 
long-run solvency through matching the maturity of its 
assets as nearly as possible to the maturity of its policy 
liabilities is stressed. This view minimizes income risk 
due to future interest rate movements, sacrifices yield 
in order to go as long as possible, and attaches little 
worth to liquidity balances. The third view is the compe­
titive or yield portfolio; it seeks the highest possible 
yield consistent with increases in default risk or income 
risk. Under the competitive portfolio, firms will trade 
along the yield curve to maximize returns, going long 
when interest rates are at cyclical highs and going short 
when yields are at cyclical lows. To accommodate such 
portfolio shifts, the firm must maintain a certain level 
of liquidity.
Not only may different firms have differing objec­
tives, but the objectives of a given firm may change through 
time in response to changes in capital market conditions,
1Leroy S. Wehrle, "Life Insurance Investment—the 
Experience of Four Companies," Yale Economic Essays, I 
(Spring, 1961), 70-136.
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in the firm’s size and growth rate, in regulatory con­
straints or tax laws, and in the composition of its accumu­
lated stock of assets. Investment philosophies are 
affected by competitive pressures from other life insurance 
companies as well as from other financial intermediaries.
The environment in which LICs operate in the United 
States appears fairly homogeneous, with some differences 
in the regulations and taxes of the 50 states. More 
importantly, because of only slight immobility in mortgage 
markets, all firms in the U.S. should have access to similar 
securities, and there must be some rational basis for port­
folio differences. In contrast, it would be difficult to 
make comparisons of operating efficiency across national 
lines or between widely separated periods of time because 
of fundamental differences or changes in capital markets. 
Evaluation of company or industry performance must accurately 
reflect relevant state regulations, taxation, and other 
constraints. Changes or differences in any of these aspects 
of the economic environment should result in different 
economic behavior.
Allowing for the selection of different objectives 
and the variation in the current economic environment, 
mismanagement is the final factor resulting in different 
portfolios. The implication here is not that all port­
folios should be identical, but that management’s behavior 
must be consistent with its own objectives. Management 
8
must be capable of balancing the marginal contributions 
of every investment toward overall performance; this 
requires understanding the economics of the capital market, 
the legal framework within which companies operate, and 
portfolio theory. In addition, it is possible that some 
companies are used as vehicles to serve private interests 
in a manner inconsistent with the long-run goals of the 
LIC or its policyholders. Regardless of the reason, 
mismanagement should eventually show up in portfolio 
performance.
The portfolio choices of LICs vary because of 
differing objectives, constraints, and, perhaps, mis­
management. The model of life insurance portfolio behavior 
developed in this study is sufficiently general that it 
should be applicable to United States and Canadian com­
panies, and, at the same time, the model possesses enough 
empirical content to permit evaluation of performance.
This study argues for a model which assumes that life 
companies maximize their long-run rate of return subject 
to solvency (survival), legal, and other relevant constraints.
Sources of Risk
Like any other business, LICs operate under con­
ditions of risk specific to their industry; three basic 
sources of risk are the uncertainty of the net cash flows 
between the LIC and its policyholders, the riskiness of 
the securities it purchases, and the uncertainty of future 
9
operating costs. The pattern of net cash flows between 
the LIC and its policyholders is altered by changes in 
mortality (which change the stream of premium inflows 
and death benefit outflows), by policy loans, by surrenders, 
and by other options exercisable by policyholders. Various 
factors such as default risk, callability, liquidity, 
uncertainties about taxation, inability to diversify 
efficiently, and the nondiversifiable risk of the securi­
ties contributes to the riskiness of the assets held by 
LICs. Future operating expenses can change due to infla­
tion, technology, and institutional changes. The nature 
of the life insurance policy ordains the sources of risk 
to life insurance companies. The premiums paid on a 
life insurance policy are figured in the three following 
steps:
(1) For a given policy, the expected death benefit 
payment in each future period throughout the policyholder's • 
life is estimated using a standard mortality table such
as the Commissioners 1958 Standard Ordinary Mortality 
Table.
(2) The present value of the stream of expected 
death benefits is found by discounting the expected cash 
outflows by an "assumed rate" of return on the life com­
pany's investments. The "net premium" is then calculated 
by finding an expected periodic premium inflow (for all 
living policyholders) whose present value, discounted 
10
back at the same assumed rate, equals the present value 
of future death benefits. A high assumed rate results 
in a lower net premium and a slower accumulation of reserves 
than would a lower rate.
(3) A loading factor is used to increase the 
"net premium," arriving at the "gross premium," which is 
the actual premium paid by policyholders. The load must be 
sufficient to provide for all operating expenses (such as 
commissions, wages and salaries, rent, taxes, etc.) as well 
as profit.
Life insurance company income comes from free 
investment income and underwriting gain, both of which 
are subject to risk. Free investment income occurs if 
the actual yield on investments exceeds that yield assumed 
for setting premiums and reserves. One source of under­
writing gain is the mortality gain, which occurs when 
the company's actual mortality experience is more favorable 
than the mortality tables used in setting the premiums, 
thereby prolonging the payment of premiums and deferring 
the payment of death benefits. The other potential source 
of underwriting gain is loading, which may exceed operat­
ing expenses. The three sources of risk directly affect 
free investment income and underwriting income and, conse­
quently, the long-run solvency of the LIC.
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Uncertainty of net cash flows 
between life insurance companies 
and their policyholders 
Deviations from expected patterns of mortality 
obviously affect the cash flows between the LIC and 
policyholders. Earlier deaths reduce the premium inflows 
and accelerate the payment of death benefits and, con­
versely, later deaths extend the receipt of premiums and 
delay death benefits. An epidemic could present companies 
with a mass of death claims at an unexpected time. While 
wartime deaths may not obligate LICs to pay the face 
value of the policies, the companies, nevertheless, must 
return the accumulated surrender values to estates of 
policyholders who die as a result of war. Mortality 
patterns change slowly, but they remain a source of risk 
to the LIC.
Furthermore, LICs are obligated to make policy loans 
at legally prescribed rates (usually 6%) at the discretion 
of the policyholder. The LIC must forego certain invest­
ments in other assets in order to accommodate the demand 
for policy loans. The demand for policy loans is, of course 
part of the demand for loanable funds by policyholders and 
is related to the cost and availability of alternative 
sources of credit. Schott found the demand for policy loans 
to be a function of the yield on 6 month prime commercial 
paper, the percentage change in the money supply (narrowly 
defined), consumer installment credit outstanding, and the 
12
change in GNP.^ The belief that policy loans are related 
to unemployment is expressed by Brimmer. Schott con­
cludes . that interest rate variations are the most 
important single influence on policy loans and have the 
most immediate and largest impact."The amount of policy 
loans outstanding is highly variable, primarily depending 
on short-term interest rates. From 1954-1965, increases 
in policy loans represented 6.12% of the increase in 
assets and the corresponding figure for 1965-1970 is 
17.34%. Since policy loans are likely to be greater at 
higher interest rates, the ability of insurance companies 
to invest as much as they wish in long-term securities 
at secular or cyclical high interest rates is restricted; 
conversely, they have relatively more funds to invest at 
low rates (when the demand for policy loan extensions or 
renewals decreases and repayments increase).
The LIC must also maintain liquidity to meet cash 
surrenders of policies; moreover, surrenders are difficult 
to forecast, although their economic function is under­
stood. Cash surrenders should increase in times of
^Frances H. Schott, "Disintermediation Through 
Policy Loans at Life Insurance Companies," Journal of 
Finance, XXVI (June, 1971), 719-29.
o Andrew F. Brimmer, Life Insurance Companies in 
the Capital Market (East Lansing: Michigan State Univer­
sity Press, 1962), p. 37.
4Schott, 727-8.
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economic crisis, such as high unemployment.in addition 
to the need for emergency funds, policyholders draw down 
savings in life policies to make payments on homes and 
consumer durables, to pay for business ventures, or to 
reinvest the funds in stocks or other equities.^ Cash 
surrenders can be explained by some of the same economic 
variables which explain policy loans. It must also be 
considered that policyholders may be more willing to tap 
this source of accumulated savings after their need for 
life insurance diminishes because of less family responsi­
bility, more savings of all forms, and the lower income which 
may accompany increased age. Thus, in addition to short- 
run economic variables, long-run demographic and economic 
factors would be expected to affect cash surrenders.
A number of other arrangements can alter the pattern 
of premium payments and benefits beyond those mentioned 
above. The right to buy additional insurance at specific 
future dates is included in some policies and a disability 
rider, which automatically pays premiums in case of disa­
bility, is a frequent option. Policyholders may stop pay­
ing premiums and convert to paid-up insurance instead of 
surrendering for cash. It is possible for beneficiaries 
to elect an annuity for life or an annuity based on interest 




participating policies (which were $3.58 billion in 1970) 
may be applied to current premiums, may be left with the 
company to earn interest, may be used to buy additional 
insurance, or may be taken out in cash.
Recent experience would suggest that payments 
other than death benefits are important in magnitude and 
substantial sources of uncertainty. In 1970t total death 
payments were $7.02 billion, of which $3.55 billion (or 
50.52%) was paid on ordinary policies, while the remainder 
was paid on group or industrial policies. Not all death 
benefits were paid in a lump sum; this is illustrated by 
the fact that $0.79 (11.25% of all death benefits) was 
left with the company under supplementary contracts. In 
1970, the net increase in policy loans was $2.24 billion, 
which was 61.3% of death benefits on permanent policies. 
During the same year, surrender values were $2.89 billion, 
which was 81.4% of death benefits on permanent policies. 
Also 5.9% of all policies (3.9% of all policies in force 
2 years or more) were surrendered. A portion of surrenders 
was left with the company for paid-up insurance or extended 
coverage, but about $2.5 billion was paid out in cash.
In attempting to match the maturity of its assets 
and liabilities, the LIC must know the timing and size of 
all future net cash flows with its policyholders. However, 
due to the uncertainty of mortality assumptions, policy 
loan demands, cash surrenders, and other arrangements.
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accurately forecasting these net cash flows is an extremely 
difficult and costly undertaking.
Riskiness of investments
Future net cash flows from investments are risky 
because the income from, and market values of, securities 
depend on the long-run solvency of the firms issuing the 
securities. The bankruptcy of a corporation terminates the 
periodic payment of interest on its bonds and usually forces 
the LIC to sell the defaulted bond at a substantial loss. 
The LIC will then generally purchase new investments. To 
compensate for the perceived risk of default, investors 
require a risk premium in the yields on bonds which is a 
function of the perceived risk. Fisher finds that 75% 
of the variation in risk premiums among bonds is explained 
by the earnings variability of the company, by the length 
of time the company has been solvent and creditors have 
not taken a loss, by the equity/debt ratio, and by the
7 market value of all publicly traded bonds of the company.' 
The first three variables are related to subjective 
default risk estimates and the fourth is related to marketa­
bility. As expected, Hickman found default rates to be 
inversely related to agency bond ratings (Moody’s and
7Lawrence Fisher, "Determinants of Risk Premiums 
on Corporate Bonds," Journal of Political Economy, LXVII 
(June, 1959), 217-37.
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Standard and Poor's),® yet Fraine has found the relative 
yield at issuance to be as good a predictor of loss rates 
as agency ratings.® The apparent clustering of defaults 
on bonds is a phenomenon of considerable importance; 
default losses on bonds of different companies are posi­
tively correlated and linked to general, as well as indus­
try, economic performance. Bond markets have operated 
to assign risk premiums to bonds to compensate bondholders 
for the additional risk of default on lower quality issues.
Another source of risk on bonds is the call feature 
which allows the issuer to buy back the bond at a specified 
price prior to,maturity. Practically all corporate bonds 
are callable, as are some Treasury bonds and some munici­
pals. The call feature operates to the detriment of bond­
holders if interest rates fall since the issuer can call 
in a bond issue, paying a call premium, and replace the 
bonds with new ones at lower interest rates.
Life company earnings rates suffered substantially 
from unscheduled portfolio turnover during the 
period 1935-45. . . . [In addition] the decline
in the life insurance industry's share of public 
utility financing (and the proportion of life
®W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and 
Investor Experience (New York: National Bureau of Econo­
mic Research, 1958), p. 176.
aHarold G. Fraine, Valuation of Securities Hold­
ings of Life Insurance Companies (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1962), pp. 52-3.
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company funds going into public utility sectors 
since 1950 was attributed principally to the 
lack of satisfactory call protection on many 
utility company debentures.10
A straightforward comparison of yields on callable bonds 
and noncallable bonds is impossible, but Jen and Wert 
found that bonds with deferred callability had lower 
yields than those immediately callable, and that this 
differential was a function of the level of coupon rates 
(those bonds with high coupons have a higher probability 
of being called).H Thus, bondholders seem to extract 
a higher yield from issuers in compensation for the risk 
of the call feature. Preferred stock is frequently 
callable and mortgages may be repaid at any time, often 
with a prepayment penalty similar to the call premium. 
Thus, the bulk of life insurance assets is subject to a 
form of call and declining interest rates could trigger 
calls of the above securities, forcing the LICs to rein­
vest the funds at lower yields.
Another source of risk to LICs is the danger of 
not being sufficiently liquid. Cash, short-term securi­
ties, maturing securities, bond sinking fund payments, 
mortgage amortizations, and the excess of premium income
^Lawrence D. Jones, Investment Policies of Life 
Insurance Companies (Boston: Division of Research, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard Uni­
versity, 1968), p. 55.
Uprank C. Jen and James E. Wert, "The Value of 
the Deferred Call Privilege," National Banking Review, 
III (March, 1966), 369-78.
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over expenses and disbursements are sources of cash 
available, not including liquidation of holdings of long­
term investments which may involve a substantial loss.
Most evidence suggests that a liquidity crisis is highly
unlikely. O'Leary states
A third characteristic of life insurance companies 
as investors which I think is pertinent here is 
the high degree of stability and magnitude of 
their net cash inflows, which makes the idea of 
liquidity preference have a little meaning for 
them. Our studies of the life insurance busi­
ness indicate that even in the bottom of the Great 
Depression the life insurance business as a whole 
generated enough income to meet disbursements with­
out the need to liquidate holdings.12
The most severe mortality crisis faced by LICs in this 
century—the 1918-19 influenze epidemic—apparently was 
insufficient to force liquidation of assets. Premium 
inflows were adequate to cover benefit payments over the 
period. J Nine of the largest 14 companies used short­
term bank borrowing but the loans were quickly repaid with 
no liquidation of assets.^ Walter concludes, "The period 
of the thirties provided a useful test of the survival 
power of life companies. For 45 large companies, total 
cash inflow from premiums and investment income exceeded
12James J. O'Leary, "The Institutional Saving- 
Investment Process and Current Economic Theory," American 
Economic Review, XLIV (May, 1954), 463.
13Jack G. Klein, "The Liquidity Structure of Life 
Insurance Companies" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. 
University of Pennsylvania, 1965), Chap. IV and Appendix B.
14Ibid., 82.
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total outflow to beneficiaries and living policyholders 
by 69% in the period 1930 through 1936.it is obvious 
that the liquidity requirements for life companies are 
far less than for deposit-type financial institutions 
and that the only extraordinary need for liquidity is to 
accommodate shifts in the composition of their portfolios. 
Liquidity constraints on life insurance portfolios appear 
trivial compared to those on commercial banks and some 
other savings institutions.
Another source of uncertainty for LICs is poten­
tial changes in their tax status, which could alter their 
net cash flows. For example, the Life Insurance Company 
Income Tax Act of 1959 raised the portion of earnings 
from invested assets subject to Federal Income taxes from 
15% to roughly 21-22% and taxed underwriting income for 
1 g the first time since 1921. The trend and effects of 
changes can be seen in Table 2-1.
15james E. Walter, The Investment Process As 
Characterized by Leading Life Insurance Companies (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 1962) , p. 8.
16Brimmer, Life Insurance Companies, p. 22.
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TABLE 2-1










Income (1) t(2) (1) v(3) (2) t(3)
1950 20* 205* 2,075* 9.76% 0.96% 9.88%
1955 189 472 2,801 40.04 6.75 16.85
1960 479 920 4,304 52.07 11.13 21.38
1965 741 1,375 6,778 53.89 10.93 20.29
1970 1,232 2,204 10,144 55.90 12.15 21.72
1950-58 1,606 4,024 23,793 39.91 6.75 16.91
1959-70 9,812 17,484 80,163 56.12 12.24 21.81
♦millions of dollars
Source: 1961, 1970 and 1971 Life Insurance Fact 
Books (New York: Institute of Life 
Insurance), 1961, 1970, and 1971.
The 1959 tax act raised the amount of federal income taxes 
relative to total taxes and to investment income and also 
raised total taxes relative to investment income. Changes 
in future tax structures subject the LIC to a degree of 
risk since taxes represent a net cash outflow beyond their 
control.
Inefficient diversification may be considered 
another source of risk for LICs. Suppliers and demanders 
of loanable funds simultaneously price individual financial 
17 assets m the capital markets. If for legal or traditional
17For a simple explanation of price determination 
of risky capital assets, see William F. Sharpe, "Capital 
Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Condi­
tions of Risk," Journal of Finance, XIX (September, 1964), 
425-42.
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reasons, LICs do not choose the assets which best allow 
them to meet their objectives, they are unnecessarily 
subjecting themselves to additional risks. Compared to 
other financial intermediaries, life companies are 
characterized by long-term investment objectives, stable 
cash inflows, and few liquidity problems; therefore, they 
may have a comparative advantage in some financial markets, 
especially in long-term markets. While the economic means 
may be available to achieve or approach more closely 
their economic objectives, LICs may fail to utilize these 
means due to mismanagement or ill-conceived regulation.
18 Some economists argue that capital markets can be in 
substantial disequilibrium. Eckstein finds ". . . the 
capital market to be imperfect, to be rife with rationing, 
ignorance, differential tax treatment, reluctance to 
finance investment from external funds, slow adjustment 
processes, etc., which destroy the normative significance 
of actual rates found m the markets." LICs should be
18 Jack Hirschlaefer, "Efficient Allocation of Capi­
tal in an Uncertain World," American Economic Review, LIV 
(May, 1964), 77; Otto Eckstein, "A Survey in the Theory of 
Public Expenditure Criteria, Reply," in Conference of the 
Universities—National Bureau Committee for Economic Research 
Public Finance: Needs, Sources, and Utilization (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961), 493-4; and Marc Nerlove, 
"Factors Affecting Differences Among Rates of Return on 
Investments in Individual Common Stocks," Review of Eco­
nomics and Statistics, L (August, 1968), 312-31.
19 Eckstein, "Public Expenditure Criteria," 493.
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able to move quickly to exploit any market imperfections 
which are to their benefit.
Besides some of the previously mentioned sources 
of risk, the attainment of long-run objectives depends 
on the yield obtainable on future net cash flows, what­
ever their source. For example, an investment in a bond 
which yields 7% to maturity actually has a compound growth 
rate of 7% to maturity only if interest payments received 
up to maturity are reinvested at a rate of return of 7%. 
Likewise, if the investment time horizon exceeds the matur­
ity of a fixed-income security, the yield at which the 
principal must be reinvested is risky. The yield on 
preferred stock is subject to risk due to variations 
in the market price of the shares and the yield on common 
shares varies due to changes in both future dividends 
and market prices.
Uncertainty of operating expenses
Since 1950, operating expenses (commissions, 
agency costs, home office costs, medical fees, and rents) 
have averaged between 16% and 18% of income (premiums, 
net investment income, and other income). These expenses 
can be split into those associated with selling and issu­
ing new policies and those associated with maintaining
20Institute of Life Insurance, 1971 Life Insurance 
Fact Book (New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 1971), 
p. 64.
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old policies. The commissions, examinations, and other 
expenses on new policies are recovered slowly out of the 
excess of gross premiums over net premiums. In order 
to offset partially the dangers of mass early surrenders, 
LICs do not credit policyholders with their full surren­
der cash reserves until the contract is 10 to 15 years 
old. Future operating expenses involved in maintaining 
already existing policies are a source of risk because 
many LIC cash inflows and outflows are fixed in nominal 
dollars, while operating expenses are not. One writer 
has suggested that hedging the general inflationary 
pressure on future operating expenses would require, by 
itself, equity investments totaling 7 to 8 percent of 
n iassets. 4- Changes in technology, such as increased use 
of electronic data processing equipment, may offset some 
of the increases in operating expenses. Most companies 
have shifted away from policies which have high adminis­
trative costs (such as industrial life insurance) in order 
to reduce their risk exposure.
") 1W. M. Anderson, "The Long View of Life Insurance 
Investment," American Life Convention General Proceedings 
(Chicago: American Life Convention, 1954), p. 367.
Portfolio decisions are primarily affected by 
the riskiness of investments, but, since the objective 
of portfolio management is to help the life company fulfill 
its obligations to policyholders, the other sources of 
risk and the tax and regulatory environment must constrain 
and guide investment choices.
24
Tax and Regulatory Environment
In addition to the sources of risk dealt with 
earlier in this study, portfolio choices are subject to 
exogenous forces, including federal income taxes, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners valuation 
procedures, state regulations on the qualitative and 
quantitative makeup of portfolios, and other taxes and 
regulations. Each of these affects investment decisions 
and, consequently, deserves analysis.
Federal income taxation
The Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act of 1959 
established two possible tax bases for LICs, namely, 
"Taxable Investment Income" and "Gain from Operations." 
If, on the one hand, the Gain from Operations is less 
than Taxable Investment Income, the tax base is the 
smaller figure. On the other hand, if Gain from Opera­
tions exceeds Taxable Investment Income, the current 
tax base is Taxable Investment Income plus one-half of 
the excess of Gain from Operations over Taxable Investment 
Income. The tax on the other half of this excess is 
deferred until it is distributed to stockholders. In 
addition, LICs pay a tax on capital gains.
Taxable Investment Income, termed the "phase I" 
tax base, consists of gross investment income less 
investment expenses, policy and contract interest require­
ments, the company’s share of tax-exempt income, and a 
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small business deduction.
The following items define the Gain from Opera­
tions, or the "phase II" tax base; gross income (premiums 
plus investment income) minus deductions for death bene­
fits, increases in policy reserves, cash surrender pay­
ments, insurance expenses, the small business deduction, 
policyholder dividends, the company’s share of tax-exempt 
income, special deductions (2 percent of group premiums 
and the greater of 3 percent of premiums on nonpartici­
pating contracts or 10 percent of the increase in reserves 
on those contracts), and loss carryback-carryforward 
provisions. Since the policyholder dividend deduction 
is limited to the excess of Gain from Operations over 
Taxable Investment Income plus $250,000, the tax base for 
large mutuals (and some stock companies selling partici­
pating contracts) will usually be the phase I tax base 
22 minus $250,000. The difference between the phase I 
and phase II tax bases is, generally speaking, the under­
writing gain which is not returned to the policyholders 
as dividends. The 1959 Act closed a loophole wherein 
underwriting gains were not taxes from 1921 to 1957. 
The phase II tax computation raised the tax burden on
^Stephen M. Kaufman, "The Life Insurance Company 
Income Tax Act of 1959: An Appraisal of the Effects upon 
the Life Insurance Industry, Part II," National Tax Journal 
XVII (March, 1964), 43; and Bernie E. Abelle, Jr., "An 
Evaluation of the Life Insurance Company Income Tax Act 
of 1959," Journal of Insurance, XXX (September, 1963), 419. 
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companies selling nonparticipating and nonreserved lines 
of insurance, which are mostly stock companies. The tax 
on investment income was expected to generate about 90 
percent of the taxes on LICs with the other 10 percent 
23 coming from taxes on underwriting gain.
That half of the excess of Gain from Operations 
over Taxable Investment Income on which taxes are paid 
currently is assigned to the Shareholders Surplus Account 
(SSA), while the untaxed half is assigned to the Policy- 
holders Surplus Account (PSA). If funds are removed from 
the PSA to the SSA to pay dividends to stockholders or 
for any other reason, a phase III tax is paid on the amount 
of funds transferred out of the PSA. Congress limited 
the PSA to 15 percent of a company's life insurance reserves 
or to 50 percent of premium income. The deferral of taxes 
on a portion of income retained behind other liabilities 
was a concession designed to encourage the existence of 
a surplus margin behind insurance contracts. Normally, 
the phase III tax collections will be dwarfed by the 
magnitude of the phase I and phase II collections. 
In addition, long-term capital gains are taxed 
separately at the capital gains rate, unless there are 
operating losses. In this case, capital gains may be used 
as an offset to such losses. Gains on which taxes have 
been paid are assigned to the SSA.
23Andrew F. Whitman and Howard E. Thompson, "The 
Impact of the 1959 Income Tax Act on Stock and Mutual 
Companies: A Simulation Study," Journal of Risk and 
Insurance, XXXIV (June, 1967), 2177
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Since the impact of the 1959 tax act can be seen 
largely through the phase I tax computations, investment 
decisions are affected primarily by this portion of the 
act. In order to help establish the nature of the phase I 
tax computation, the following symbols are used:
T = phase I income tax
l = investment yield
P = policy interest requirement
R = mean life insurance reserves
Ra= adjusted life insurance reserves
A = mean assets
Q = reduction items
D = dividends received
E = tax-exempt interest
r = average assumed rate of return on R
i = I/A
m = marginal corporate tax rate
All symbols denoted by capital letters are in dollars.
A Lie's taxable investment income is simply its 
investment yield less its policy interest requirement and 
less certain reduction items. The tax liability is
T = m(I - P - Q) - 25,000(m - .22). (1)
Taxes are reduced by 25,000(m - .22), since the first 
$25,000 of corporate income is taxed at the lower marginal 
rate of 22 percent.
The policy interest rate requirement is found by 
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multiplying the actual rate of return on assets times 
adjusted reserves.
P = i . R_ (2)A 
In the 1959 law, adjusted reserves are defined as
RA = (1 + lOr - 10i)R. (3)
By substitution, 
2P = i(l + lOr - 10i)R = (i + lOir - lOi )R. (4)
A company with R = $1,000,000, r = .03, and i = .04 would 
have adjusted reserves of .90R = $900,000 and a policy 
interest requirement of $36,000, even though it actually 
owes its policyholders 3 percent of $1,000,000 or $30,000.
The reduction items are
q = (T " ■£) (E + .850) + 25,000 (5)
I
I - P
—-— is the company's share of investment income; E is 
interest received on municipals; and .850 is the amount 
of the 85 percent intercorporate dividend exclusion. If 
the company's share of investment income is 30 percent, 
only 30 percent of tax-exempt interest and excluded 
dividends may be used to reduce taxable income. This is 
one unique feature of the tax which obviously discriminates 
against LICs since any other corporate investor can deduct 
100 percent of such income from its taxable income. Life 
companies also have a small business deduction of the lesser 
of 10 percent of investment yield or $25,000. Equation (5) 
assumes investment income of at least $250,000.
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Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation
(1) gives us the tax on investment income.
T = [I - (i + lOir - 10i2)R - (T ~ -) (E + .850)
- 25,000] ' m - 25,000(m - .22) (6)
Clearly,
T = {I - ( | + 10 r (j) - 10 (J)2] R 
A A A
T R- [ 1 - (1 + lOr - 10 t-) * t- ] (E + .850)
- 25,000} * m - 25,000(m - .22) (7)
The marginal tax rate on fully taxable income is 
found by taking the partial derivative of (7) with respect 
to I.
-6T = [1 - (1 + Mr - 20l) | - 10R(E -^----1 ' »
(8)
2S-Y = 20 £- • m (9)
«I2 A2
Equation (7) is concave from above and reaches a minimum 
where —= 0. At levels of I greater than the I where T
6 Tis minimized, will be monotonically increasing. The 
marginal tax rate depends on the parameters in equation (7) 
Dwhich apply to a particular company. is less than unity 
for a solvent company, averaging .93 for mutuals and .86 
for stock companies. (1 + lOr - 20i) is also less than 
unity as long as i >r/2; this has never failed to happen. 
10(E + .85D)/A has been very small historically. Thus, 
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the marginal tax rate of LICs is positive and progressive 
for a wide range of parameter values about those which 
currently exist. (This progressivity can also be estab­
lished by finding the elasticity of taxes with respect to 
income.)
The manner in which the tax-deductible policy 
interest requirement is determined is responsible for the 
tax progressivity. The only non-linear term in equation 
(7) is in the policy interest requirement. When income 
changes, the policy interest requirement changes as well, 
so —will depend on the elasticity of P with respect to I.
= (1 + lOr - 20i) 5 (10)
6P I = (1 + 10r - 20i) nn
F (1 + lOr - lOi)
-cp T r p T—• p <1 for any positive i. In addition,
6P ias long as 1 + 10r>20i. If 0 <• p <1, an increase 
in income increases a tax deduction by a fraction of that 
increase and the marginal tax rate will be less than the 
corporate rate. Since the proportional increase in P is 
less than the proportional increase in income, the frac­
tion of income subject to a constant rate increases, and 
the tax is, therefore, progressive. If E and D are zero, 
the marginal tax rate will equal the corporate rate where 
20i = 1 + lOr. If r = .03, this occurs when i = .065.
At this time —• ^ = 0. If i increases further, the
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marginal tax rate continues to increase.
The marginal tax on tax-exempt interest is found
by taking the partial derivative of (8) with respect to E.
(R T Since E is included in I, —= 1.
= {1 - (1 + 10r - 201)5 , 10R(E + 85D)
n- [1 -(1 + lOr - 10i)^ ]}• m (12)
According to equation (13) , the marginal tax rate on tax- 
exempt interest is the marginal tax rate on fully taxable 
income less the product of the company's share of invest­
ment income and the marginal corporate tax rate. If 
t — p 6T 6t•L = .25 and m = .48, —is .12 less than —The 
greater the company's share of investment income, the 
greater the differential absolute advantage of tax-exempt 
income. However, only if the company's share is 100 
percent does the LIC enjoy the full tax exemption. 
Similarly, the marginal tax rate on dividends is
= (1 - (1 + lOr - 20i)f - + ._85D)
o D •“ ^2
■D
- .85[1 - (1 + lOr - 10i)] - }• m (14)
-4^ = 4v - *85 •m (15)
od o I I
The same comments which apply to tax-exempt interest apply 
to dividends, except the absolute advantage of dividend 
income over taxable income is 85 percent as large as that 
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of tax-exempt interest over taxable income.
A numerical example illustrating the marginal tax 
rates on I, E, and D appears in Table 2-2. Company B is 
identical to Company A except that it has $30,000 of 
additional fully-taxable income; Company C has $30,000 
of additional tax-exempt interest, and Company D has an 
additional $30,000 of dividends. The marginal tax rates 
for Company A on I, E, and D, computed using equations 
(8), (12), and (14), were .3075, .1675, and .1885, res­
pectively, which are approximately the same as the incre­
mental tax rates computed in Table 2-2. The relationships 
in the mathematical explanation of the life company tax 
are illustrated by this numerical example.
If the current earnings rate exceeds the average 
of the previous four years, the policy interest requirement 
is computed somewhat differently. The change can be seen 
by substituting
i* = .81 + .2i (16)
for i in equations (2), (3), and (4), and then consistently 
using these new definitions of P and wherever they 
subsequently appear, i is a simple average of the current 
earnings rates for the previous four years; i is the average 
for the current year, while i' is the five-year moving 
average including the current year. This complicates the 
analysis slightly by introducing an additional parameter 
(I) and it slows down the progressitity of the tax rate.
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TABLE 2-2
EXAMPLE OF TAXATION OF LIFE COMPANY INCOME















(1) 1,350,000 1,380,000 1,380,000 1,380,000
(2) 60,000 60,000 90,000 60,000
(3) 40,000 40,000 40,000 70,000
(4) 30,000,000 30,000,000 30,000,000 30,000,000
(5) .045 .046 .046 .046
(6) .03 .03 .03 .03
(7) 25,000,000 25,000,000 25,000,000 25,000,000
(8) 21,250,000 21,000,000 21,000,000 21,000,000
(9) 956,250 966,000 966,000 966,000
(10) .2917 .3 .3 .3
(11) 52,417 53,200 62,200 60,850
(12) 341,333 360,800 351,800 353,150
(13) 157,340 166,684 162,324 163,012
(14) — 9,344 4,984 5,672
(15) — .3115 .1661 .1891
(1) = investment income = I
(2) = tax-exempt income (included in (1)) = E
(3) = dividends (included in (1)) = D
(4) = mean assets = A
(5) = (l)/(4) = current earnings rate = i
(6) = average reserve interest rate = r
(7) = policy reserves = R
(8) = adjusted policy reserves = R.
(9) = policy interest requirement = P
(10) = company’s share of investment income =
(11) = reduction items = (10). [ (2) + .85(3)]
+ 25,000 = Q
(12) = taxable investment income = (1) - (9) - (11)
(13) = tax = .48 [ (12) - 25,000] + 22 (25,000) = T
(14) = incremental tax on 30,000 increase in income
(15) = incremental tax rate = (14) t 30,000
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When the marginal tax rate is viewed as a function of i, 
a kink appears at i = i, as in Figure 2-1.
i
Fig. 2-1.—Marginal tax rate as a function 
of the current rate of return 
on assets
Since i* is a moving average and since i is very stable 
(resulting from years of accumulated investment decisions), 
it is unlikely that -yj will reach the full corporate 
rate in the near future, given current parameters.
The impact of federal taxation on investment 
decisions is complex; an examination of some of the fac­
tors involved seems to be relevant here. In the first 
place, progressive taxation reinforces conservative 
investment behavior and transforms the before-tax risk­
return choices in such a way that a risk-averse investor 
will choose a lower return, lower risk set of assets than 
he would have chosen were taxes not progressive.
Secondly, the effective partial exemption of 
interest on municipals can cause their after-tax yields to 
be generally inferior to after-tax yields on corporates
35 
of similar quality. If the marginal tax on investment 
income averages .30 and the company's share of investment 
income averages .25, then the marginal tax on tax-exempt 
interest is .18, and the before-tax yield on municipals 
must be at least 83.3 percent of the before-tax yield 
on corporates to have a superior after-tax yield. Since 
the yield on municipals seldom approaches this fraction, 
LICs are generally not interested in them.
A third point to be considered is that the federal 
income tax treatment of preferred stock held by LICs 
places them in a less favorable position than other 
corporations because LICs do not enjoy the full benefit 
of the intercorporate dividend exclusion and, consequently, 
have lower after-tax yields on preferred stock than 
other corporate investors. Inferior risk, liquidity, 
valuation, and quantitative restrictions, in conjunction 
with the proration of dividend income between company 
and policyholders, have kept life company holdings of 
preferred stock low historically.
A fourth consideration deserving mention is that 
common stock is given favorable treatment over bonds. 
The return on common stock can be divided into a dividend 
(current) yield and a yield through share-price apprecia­
tion. The dividend component of the yield is taxed at 
lower marginal rates than fully taxable interest; the 
tax on capital gains will usually be lower than the
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marginal rate on interest and can be deferred until the 
capital gains are actually realized. However, since life 
insurance companies enjoy only a fraction of the inter­
corporate dividend exclusion, Lie's relative preference 
for common stock is not as strong as it would be other­
wise.
A fifth and final item that attention should be 
drawn to is that the treatment of the real estate invest­
ment is generally unfavorable. Much LIC real estate 
investment has been sale-leaseback or purchase-leaseback 
arrangements which closely resemble mortgages. The 
attractiveness of leasing is necessarily tied to Internal 
Revenue Service guidelines regarding the expense allo­
cation depreciation. If the depreciation deduction is 
reduced by increasing the depreciable life of an asset, 
the portion of the lease payment which is considered a 
non-taxed return of principal decreases. Therefore, 
leases may be less flexible and more heavily taxed than 
mortgages.However, this conclusion is not a result of 
the 1959 tax act alone, but of numerous other IRS regu­
lations.
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, it 
can be concluded that federal income taxation, as codified 
in the Life Insurance Income Tax Act of 1959, drives deeply
2^See Kaufman, "Life Insurance Company Income Tax 
Act, Part II," 53-5.
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into general investment philosophy and also has a strong 
impact on concrete choices among investment alternatives.
NAIC valuation
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners 
sets valuation standards for LICs in the United States 
designed to meet the needs of the industry and to promote 
uniformity across companies. In order to understand the 
impact of the valuation standards on portfolio choices, 
a brief description of the treatment of bonds, mortgages, 
common stock, preferred stock, real estate, and policy 
loans is pertinent to the study at this point.
All bonds in the top four rating categories of 
one of the three major rating agencies or bonds meeting 
one of two more liberal earnings tests qualify for valua­
tion at amortized cost. If a bond is ineligible for 
amortization under the above or is in default with respect 
to interest or principal, it must be carried at market 
value. This treatment is justified by assuming that 
bonds are held to maturity. Furthermore, alternative 
valuation systems for non-marketable private placements 
could prove unsatisfactory. By this device, bond values 
and bond rates of return are extremely stable on LIC 
financial statements. As with bonds, mortgage values and 
yields are also extremely stable under their valuation 
scheme. Mortgage loans are valued at the original princi­
pal less all repayments of principal and no quality tests 
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must be passed to qualify. Common stock is carried on 
the books at year-end market values, but yields are based 
on dividend yields alone. Preferred stock has been placed 
on the books at original cost since 1965. From 1957-1965, 
preferred stock was valued according to a weighted moving 
average of year-end market values called the "one-fifth 
rule." Yields are dividend yields alone andt along with 
statement values, are very stable. Real estate is valued 
at cost plus capital improvement less accumulated deprecia­
tion. When it is acquired through foreclosure of mortgages, 
real estate is carried at the amount of the debt. If market 
values are less than book value, the real estate should 
be written down. Book values of real estate are stabi­
lized, as are yields, and both are subject to depreciation 
schedules and other allocations. Policy loans are carried 
at face value, and, finally a number of accrual and 
deferred asset and liability accounts peculiar to the 
life insurance industry also exist.
Perhaps the most unusual account on the right 
side of the balance sheet is the mandatory securities 
valuation reserve, which is merely an allocation of surplus 
intended to absorb default losses or capital gains and 
losses in order to minimize their impacts on surplus. 
The annual allocations into the reserve are .05 percent 
of almost all amortizable bonds up to a cumulative total 
of 1 percent of such bonds and 1 percent of amortizable 
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bonds failing an earnings test ("Test 2"), bonds in 
default, preferred stock, and common stock up to a total 
of 20 percent of such assets, plus all realized or unreali­
zed net capital gains. Contributions to the reserve 
against common stock cease at 20 percent, but capital 
gains must be credited to the reserve until 30 percent is 
reached.
Since the value of a high quality bond and pre­
ferred stock portfolio varies inversely with the value of 
a common stock portfolio over the business cycle, the use 
of different valuation methods for the securities will 
result in systematically biased balance sheets over the 
business cycle. This bias is a result of the inconsistent 
valuation procedures applied to different categories of 
investment.
The rate of return figures supplied by LICs on 
assets and on investment classes are necessarily tied to 
the idiosyncrasies of the valuation process. These rates 
of return are subject to the historical accident of when 
net cash inflows had to be invested, and this is only 
partially influenced by investing staffs. Walter adds,
25 . .Alden C. Olson, The Impact of Valuation Require­
ments on the Preferred Stock Investment Policies of Life 
Insurance Companies; Occasional Paper No. 13 (East Lansing, 
Michigan: Bureau of Business and Economic Research, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Michigan State 
University, 1964), p. 101.
4o
As an exclusive measure of comparative performance, 
the composite rate of return on invested assets is 
deficient. It weights the results of past invest­
ment decisions more than those attributable to 
current behavior and is affected by asset growth 
over which the investment staff has but limited 
control. It further omits capital gains and losses 
and reflects arbitrary expense allocations.^6
Many of the valuation standards apparently were selected 
for convenience. Bonds are subject to quality scrutiny 
and contributions to the mandatory security valuation 
reserve are made on bonds. Mortgages, which as a group 
are riskier than bonds, are not written down to market 
value until default actually occurs, and there is a ten­
dency to carry the foreclosed property at the outstanding 
balance on the debt. No contributions to the mandatory 
securities valuation reserve are made on mortgages.
Preferred stock has a reservation rate of 1 percent com­
pared to .05 percent for bonds, even though the default 
experience on preferred stock held by LICs has not been 
27 inferior to that on bonds. No contributions to the reserve 
or quality standards exist for real estate.
Fraine presents a list of sixteen inconsistencies 
28of the valuation procedure, which extend far beyond those 
mentioned above. An understanding of these inconsistencies 
prompted Jones to write,
n zr Walter, The Investment Process, p. 12. 
Fraine, Valuation of Securities, p. 95.
28ibid., pp. 163-5.
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One of the consequences of a badly designed valua­
tion system is that life companies will have to 
formulate policy with the "system risks," as well 
as "real risks" in mind. As we have seen, there 
is abundant evidence of serious weakness in the 
asset valuation regulations concerning life insur­
ance companies. Therefore this part of the exter­
nal environment can be expected to have had an 
impact upon portfolio selections.29
Espie further criticizes the impact of NAIC 
valuation requirements by saying.
The fact that these conventions may be unrealistic 
in individual company situations is subordinated to 
their usefulness and simplicity in demonstrating 
solvency to regulatory authorities. Further subor­
dinated is the fact that when such conventions over­
value liabilities and undervalue assets by unknown 
amounts—as compared with theoretical but unknown 
exact valuation accuracy—surplus is distorted, 
and earnings, which reflect the change of surplus 
from one year-end to another, may be doubly dis­
torted. 29 30
29Jones, Investment Policies, p. 143.
30Robert G. Espie, "Financial Statements," in 
Life Insurance, rev. cd. by Dan M. McGill (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 861.
The accounting procedures promulgated by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners undoubtedly are 
extremely useful for some purposes, but they may obscure 
the real economic behavior of the firm and, in some cases, 
interfere with investment decision-making.
State qualitative and quantitative 
portfolio restrictions
The investments of life companies are regulated by 
the states in which they are chartered; a few states 
dominate the regulation of life assets either directly or 
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indirectly. For example, life companies chartered in 
New York own about 30 percent of the industry's assets; 
those not chartered in New York that are licensed to sell 
insurance there are required to "substantially comply" 
with New York insurance laws. Companies licensed to sell 
insurance in New York hold over two-thirds of industry 
assets. In addition, insurance commissions in other 
states may pattern their regulations after New York's 
laws. While control of life companies might seem quite 
decentralized and subject to fifty different sets of 
regulations, a few states actually regulate the vast 
majority of industry assets. Besides New York, the most 
important states are Connecticut, Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
Several states regulate the quality of securities 
acquired and their relative quantities, sometimes broken 
down by security type, by industry, and by individual 
issuer. The severity of the regulations varies considerably 
across security types and the emphasis also varies from 
state to state, with New York generally possessing the 
most stringent investment statutes. Since these statutes 
have a direct impact on portfolio choices, a survey of 
current regulations is appropriate. The regulations are 
reviewed in the following order: U.S. government securi­
ties, state and local securities, corporate bonds, mort­
gage loans, preferred stock, common stock, real estate.
31 and leeway clauses.
Investments in obligations of the federal govern­
ment or in debt guaranteed by the federal government are 
generally unrestricted, whereas obligations of foreign 
governments are restricted. For example, the New York 
laws restrict life holdings to the greater of 150 percent 
of a company's liabilities in a given country or the 
amount that country requires the company to invest there. 
New York companies may invest up to one percent of assets 
in foreign securities in addition to the above.
Limitations on the quantity of state and local 
securities owned generally do not exist, although the 
quality of these securities eligible for investment is 
regulated. Special assessment bonds, as well as issues 
in default, are usually forbidden. Often issues of small 
municipalities are ineligible and the amount of tax- 
supported obligations cannot exceed the limit of 10 per­
cent placed on all Canadian securities (which is an 
exception to the laws on foreign securities).
Quantitative restrictions on the proportion of 
assets devoted to corporate bonds have no operational 
significance; however, qualitative restrictions vary 
considerably from state to state. Connecticut and New 
Jersey demand only that the bonds not be in default while 
in New York complex earnings requirements depend on the
31The following is a summary of regulations given 
in Brimmer, Jones, and Walter, cited earlier. 
type of bond. Mortgage bonds have less stringent earnings 
tests than debentures and contingent interest obligations 
face even stricter earnings requirements. Generally 
speaking, unsecured loans to unincorporated businesses 
are forbidden. It is a fact that some states have easier 
requirements for railroad and utility bonds than for bonds 
of other industries.
For the most part, the quantity of bonds of a 
single issuer is generally limited. In New York, the 
proportion of assets issued by a single institution cannot 
exceed five percent and the proportion in a single issue 
cannot exceed one-half percent. In New Jersey, this limit 
is 10 percent of surplus, while in Wisconsin no single 
secured issue can exceed two percent of assets and no 
single unsecured issue can exceed one percent of assets. 
The most significant impact of regulations on corporate 
bonds is the ineligibility of low-quality debt issues.
Mortgage loans guaranteed by the VA or insured 
by the FHA are unrestricted although conventional mort­
gages are limited to 40 percent of assets in New York. 
No single parcel can exceed the greater of $30,000 or 
2 percent of assets and mortgages of a single mortgagor 
cannot exceed 10 percent. On single-family homes, the 
loan/value ratio cannot exceed 75 percent and loans must 
be fully amortized in 30 years. On leaseholds, the loan/ 
value ratio must be less than 66-2/3 percent and mortgages 
must be fully amortized between 21 and 30 years.
Preferred stock often must pass earnings and 
dividends tests. Wisconsin limits preferred stock to 
5 percent of assets, Illinois 10 percent. New Jersey and 
New York each 2 percent. Some states restrict preferred 
stock within their leeway provisions and some express 
maximum holdings as a percentage of surplus. In New York, 
a LIC cannot own more than 20 percent of the outstanding 
preferred stock of a firm.
Common stock often must meet earnings or divi­
dends requirements, and New York requires listing on a 
recognized exchange. New York quantitative restrictions 
were significantly liberalized in 1969; in New York, 
common stock investments now are limited to the lesser of 
10 percent of assets or 100 percent of surplus (5 percent 
and 50 percent prior to 1969). The limit on holdings of 
one issuer is one percent of assets and five percent of 
the issuer's outstanding shares (0.2 percent and 2 percent 
before 1969). For purposes of complying with this law, 
stocks are valued at cost. Until 1969, virtually all 
other states had significantly less binding quantitative 
restrictions on common stock than New York. In 1970, 
limits were placed on real estate investment, raising 
the limits from five to ten percent of assets, and parcel 
sizes are also limited. Income-producing real estate and 
common equities have been the most restricted categories 
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for life companies.
"Leeway" or "basket" clauses have been enacted 
by many states to permit LICs to invest a portion of their 
assets in a manner otherwise prohibited by their statutes. 
The leeway provision is 8 percent in Connecticut, 5 percent 
in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, and 3.5 percent (2.0 per­
cent before 1966) in New York, and 2 percent in New Jersey. 
In Massachusetts, all assets in excess of three-fourths 
of reserves may be invested freely. Some of the leeway 
clauses are qualified to prevent life companies from 
acquiring more than a given percentage of a corporation’s 
outstanding common shares.
There are indications that some of the portfolio 
constraints listed above have severely constricted life 
insurance investment behavior. Perhaps, the best evidence 
that the restrictions have been binding is the persistent 
(and successful) lobbying of the industry for liberali­
zation of these statutes. For example, permissible common 
stock holdings for New York companies were raised from 
zero to the lesser of 3 percent of assets or one-third of 
surplus in 1951. In 1957, the limit was raised to the 
lesser of 5 percent of assets or one-half surplus, and in 
1969, it was raised to the lesser of 10 percent of assets 
or 100 percent of surplus. The limit on holding of a 
single corporation's common shares was raised from 0.1 
percent to 0.2 percent to 1.0 percent. The maximum holding
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of a corporation's shares as a fraction of its outstanding 
shares has been raised from 2 to 5 percent. Dividend and 
earnings requirements on common shares were relaxed in 
1967. Recently, statutes on investments outside of 
common stock have also been liberalized.
Another indication that some portfolio constraints 
have been binding is that companies in states with less 
stringent limits often take advantage of them. Of the 
largest 150 companies at the end of 1957, the thirteen 
New York companies held 0.6 percent of common stock 
(2.5 percent total stock); the ten Massachusetts companies 
held 7.1 percent of common stock (8.7 percent of total 
stock); and the ten Texas companies held 7.9 percent of 
common stock (9.7 percent total stock). Some of the 
Massachusetts or Texas companies may have not been completely 
free of the New York laws if they were licensed to sell 
in New York and, consequently, had to comply substantially 
with its investment laws. British life companies have 
held more equities than American companies; they have 
increased their holdings of preferred and common shares 
from 18.7 percent of assets in 1950 to 22.2 percent in 
1955 and to 26.3 percent in 1960. The fraction in common 
shares alone was 11.1, 15.3, and 21.2 percent for the same
Brimmer, Life Insurance Companies, Table IX-12,
p. 351.
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33 three dates. Both the actual fraction of common stock 
holdings and the fraction permitted under New York law 
have exhibited increasing trends in the post-war years. 
The interstate and international comparisons imply that 
New York constraints have been binding.
Other taxes and regulations
Numerous additional taxes and regulations besides 
those discussed earlier affect life insurance portfolio 
decisions. State and local governments impose premium 
taxes, property taxes, income taxes, unemployment taxes, 
license fees, and other miscellaneous levies on LICs. 
Taxes on life and health premiums average 2 percent of
34 premiums and range from 1-3/4 to 4 percent. Some states 
permit credits against premium taxes based on other state 
taxes paid or on investments made within the state;
other states tax only out-of-state companies or tax domes­
tic companies at lower rates. Retaliatory provisions are 
employed by various states, such as taxing out-of-state 
companies at the rate the foreign states would tax a 
domestic company or including a minimum rate and then 
charging domestic companies an even lower rate.
JJG. Clayton and W. T. Osborn, Insurance Company 
Investment, Principles and Policies (London: George 
Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1965). Appendix Table 2, p. 254.
34 Dan M. McGill, Life Insurance (rev. ed.; Home­
wood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), p. 928.
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The strongest geographical restriction on invest­
ment choices is the Texas law (the Robertson Law) requir­
ing LICs to purchase Texas securities totaling at least 75 
. . 35percent of the reserves behind policies sold m the state. 
After the law was passed in 1907, most of the large com­
panies left the state but gradually returned, perhaps 
because the strength of the Texas economy supplied suffi­
cient securities to fulfill the 75 percent requirement. 
By 1959, nine states, in addition to Texas, gave tax 
reductions to LICs investing certain percentages of their 
assets within the state. The existence of absolute 
geographical restrictions or tax rebates based on geo­
graphical distribution of assets is inconsistent with 
the development of a national capital market. However, 
the premium taxes and other state and local taxes listed 
above do not significantly interfere with the allocation 
of investible funds, although there may be some minor 
influences.
Any regulations which affect the economic units 
selling primary securities in the capital markets or the 
institutions buying those primary securities might affect 
life insurance portfolio investment choices. For example 
(as mentioned previously), the Federal Power Commission 
and the Securities and Exchange Commission usually insist 
or See Brimmer, Life Insurance Companies, pp, 66-7. 
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that utility bonds be callable immediately at low call 
premiums; as a result LICs are reluctant to acquire utility 
bonds when interest rates are considered above normal. 
Mortgage insurance and the attendant regulations of the 
characteristics of the insured mortgages by the Veterans 
Administration and the Federal Housing Administration 
alter the risk and return parameters of this type mort­
gage. Regulations on other financial intermediaries would 
also indirectly affect the life insurance industry's 
relative competitiveness as a supplier of loanable funds 
to the capital markets.
Summary
The impact of federal income taxation, valuation 
procedures, state qualitative and quantitative restric­
tions, and other taxes and regulations on life portfolios 
are very complex. The laws and regulations are so inter­
related that the impact of only the bluntest can be sing­
led out and measured. Nevertheless, portfolio decisions 
must be made and evaluated in this environment.
Life companies and their regulators coexist in a 
partially closed system in which commonly held options are 
reinforced and persist. The nature of the relationship 
between the industry and its regulators tends to shape 
investment policy and inhibit competitive responses.
Jones speculates on this relationship as follows:
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Presumably life companies approval of statutory 
regulations is based in part on its usefulness 
as a device to restrict competition. Also, some 
companies no doubt genuinely fear management 
discretion with respect to investment policy 
would lead to speculative abuses by some small 
life companies, resulting in losses to their 
policyholders and bad public relations for the 
industry. This mix of motives is often present 
in regulated industries and it is difficult to 
gauge their relative importance.36
Walter also has reservations about the industry's per­
formance .
Whether life companies as a group perform as well 
as they might is doubtful. The common focus seems 
to be in matching or outperforming competition 
rather than exhausting the feasible possibilities 
for higher returns. In part, this orientation is 
attributable to the hesitancy of most life com­
panies to deviate notably from standard patterns 
of behavior. In part, it is due to a tradition 
of limited investment staff and to certain ambi­
guities in the risk-taking capacity of life com­
panies . 37
The avoidance of an abnormal portfolio is fostered 
because the regulators can be expected to accommodate an 
industry-wide crisis, but not the crisis of an individual 
firm; thus, regulations appear to be fair-weather stan­
dards. Valuation procedures, tax laws, or other portfolio 
restrictions have responded to the problems of the industry 
as a whole during the 1918-19 influenze epidemic, the 
depression, and World War II. If the firm's crises do 
not coincide with those of industry, help from regulators 
will not necessarily be forthcoming. The penalty for a
O £Jones, Investment Policies, p. 102.
37Walter, The Investment Process, pp. 6-7. 
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period of poor performance is ameliorated if the same 
problems are shared by your competitors. This is accom­
plished not by being better than the competition, but 
merely by being like them. In such a system, innovation 
and calculated risk-taking will be rare.
The following chapters present an analytical 
model of life insurance portfolio behavior and empirically 
test some hypotheses derived from that model. The sources 
of risk and the tax and regulatory environment guide the 
formulation of the anlaytical model, suggest some specific 
hypotheses which will be tested, and affect the quality of 
the data base used in the statistical analysis.
CHAPTER III
MODEL OF LIFE INSURANCE 
PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR
Chapter III presents and analyzes a chance- 
constrained model of life insurance portfolio behavior 
which is used to generate hypotheses, some of which are 
statistically tested in Chapter IV. After the general 
model is introduced, two subsystems of the model, namely 
the investment opportunity subsystem and the preference 
subsystem, are explored in detail. In conclusion, possible 
extensions and limitations of the model are discussed, 
and the chance-constrained model is compared to other 
portfolio models.
A life insurance company's ability to satisfy 
its contractual obligations depends on its mortality 
experience, its future operating expenses, and its invest­
ment performance. This study concentrates on the third 
aspect mentioned above and abstracts away from uncer­
tainties connected with the first two by assuming that 
the mortality of a company's policyholders is precisely 
that predicted by the company's mortality tables, that 
the company receives premiums from its policyholders on 
whole life policies until they die (at which time the 
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company pays death benefits equal to the face value of 
the policies), and that the company has no operating 
expenses. Thus, the basic analysis makes no attempt to 
incorporate policy loans and surrender of policies for 
cash value. Subsequently, it will be shown how these 
assumptions can be relaxed and entered in the model.
The Chance-Constrained Model
The economic relationships concerning life insur­
ance portfolio management can be summarized in this 
chance-constrained model
max Return on assets owned at time t (1)
s.t. Prob [ (1+r) Assetst > Obligationst+2.1 — a (2) 
other portfolio constraints 
where a= probability of solvency
(1 -a) = probability of insolvency
and r = expected rate of return on assets
The objective of the life company is to maximize its rate 
of return on assets subject to the constraint that it has 
a high probability of being solvent in the next period
Ipor examples of chance-constrained programming 
applied to other financial intermediaries, see Joel Fried, 
"Bank Portfolio Selection," Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, V (June, 1970), 203-27; N. H. Agnew 
R. A. Agnew, J. Rasmussen, and K. R. Smith, "An Appli­
cation of Chance-Constrained Programming to Portfolio 
Selection in a Casualty Insurance Firm," Management 
Science, XV (June, 1969), B512-20; and A. Charnes and 
Sten Thore, "Planning for Liquidity in Financial Insti­
tutions: The Chance-Constrained Method," Journal of 
Finance, XXI (December, 1966), 649-74. The Charnes- 
Thore article is applied to savings and loan associations.
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and subject to any other relevant portfolio constraints. 
This basic model analyzes the function of life insurance 
companies as financial intermediaries buying primary 
securities and issuing their own unique indirect security, 
policy reserves. This model can be developed more fully 
using the gross dollar amounts invested in various types 
of assets or using the proportions of assets .invested in 
various types of securities as endogenous variables.
Proportions are used here because relative sizes are easier 
to visualize than absolute sizes and because hypotheses 
stated as proportions prove more convenient to test in 
Chapter IV. The funds allocated to various types of 
securities are the instruments the LIC uses to maximize 
the value of its objective function.
Assume the rate of return on assets is multivariate 
normal. Then the above model can be rewritten more com­
pletely:
I
max r = R X. (3)
' ' 1/2s.t. (1+R) Xt - Z(X VX) > LRt+i - NCFt+1 (4) 
X^ _> 0 for all securities (5)
X. < K. for some i (6)i “ 1
I X = 1 (7)
i 
where:
X = vector of proportions of assets composed 
of n securities (n x 1)
R = vector of expected rates of returns on 
these n securities (n x 1)
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Z = inverse of the standard normal cumu­
lative distribution
V = variance-covariance matrix of rates 
of return on these securities (n x n) 
(x’vx)1/2 = standard deviation of return of 
portfolio X
LR = (legal reserves in period t+1) / 
1 (assets in period t)
NCFt+i = (net cash flow^^^) / (assetst)
= (premiums. .  - death benef its^.-i) / t+1 LT1
assets^
In addition, the following symbols will be used in the 
remainder of this section:
LRt = (legal reserves^.) / assetst 
= 1 - LRfc = surplust / assets^ 
k = contractually promised rate of return on 
reserves
a = (x’vx)1^2
The life company maximizes its rate of return (3) subject 
to a probabilistic solvency constraint (4), non-negativity 
constraints (5), legal constraints (6), and a balance 
sheet constraint (7). Obviously no general solution of 
this model is possible: the model must be solved algo­
rithmically for a specific case.
The chance-constrained model can be compart­
mentalized into two subsystems: a preference set derived 
from constraint (4) and an opportunity set derived from 
constraints (5), (6), and (7). The LIC attempts to maxi­
mize its rate of return given the feasible set determined 
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by the intersection of the preference set and the oppor­
tunity set.
2Since LR,,1 - NCF,= (l+k)LR., the chance- t+1 E+l t
constraint (4) can be rewritten:
1/2(1+R) *Xt - (l+k)LRt - Z(X’VX) >0 (8)
1/2and since St + R'xt - kLRfc - Z(x'vx) >0 (9)
this can be rewritten as
St + r - kLRt - Z a > 0. (10)
If the current surplus plus expected earnings less interest 
on reserves is positive, the company is solvent, and the 
company has a probability of a of being solvent if this 
expected result minus zo is still positive. This constraint 
is linear in r and o and can be rewritten
o < | (St - kLRt) + | r. (11)
This equation, given Z, St, k, and LR^, specifies the 
preference set and the line where the equality holds will 
be called the preference function.
Any vector X which satisfies the non-negativity, 
legal, and balance sheet constraints generates a particular 
r = r'x and a = (x’vx)!^. possible combinations or 
r and o satisfying these constraints constitute the 
opportunity set enclosed by DIEJFGH in Figure 3-1.
^This is established in a later section of this
chapter.
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Fig. 3-1.—Chance-Constrained Portfolio Model
The preference set is also indicated on Figure 3-1 as 
the area below and including the preference function 
o = l(St-kLRt) + r. The intersection of the opportunity 
set and the preference set is bounded by IEJ, and the rate 
of return is maximized at point J. Any point satisfying 
the chance-constrained model will fall along EJF, the 
Markowitz efficiency frontier, and will have the maximum 
return for a given level of risk (o) and the minimum risk 
for a given level of return. In general, the optimal 
portfolio is the set of assets which yields the risk­
return combination where the efficiency frontier and 
preference function intersect.
The next two sections of this chapter examine the 
investment opportunity subsystem and preference subsystem 
and the effects on portfolio choices of changes in the
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parameters of these two subsystems.
The Investment Opportunity Subsystem
The Markowitz model
The set of combinations of portfolio risk and 
return available to the life company depends on the 
parameters of the expected return vector R, the variance­
covariance matrix V, the legal constraints on some types 
of securities, the non-negativity constraints, and the 
balance sheet constraint. Changes in any of these para­
meters would shift the opportunity set and, of course, 
result in a new portfolio where the preference function 
intersects the shifted efficiency frontier. Any parameter 
changes resulting in a rightward (downward) shift in the 
efficiency frontier will result in management’s choosing 
a higher return, riskier portfolio along the preference 
function. Likewise, a leftward (upward) shift in the 
efficiency frontier will result in a less risky, lower 
return portfolio. The portfolio of securities which 
yields a particular point on the efficiency frontier can
3 be found with this model:
3The solution for this model without the non­
negativity and legal constraints is found in Jack Francis 
and Stephen Archer, Portfolio Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1971), pp. 78-80. The 
basic model is found in Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selec­
tion," Journal of Finance, VII (March, 1952), 77-91, and 
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversifi- 




s.t. r’x = r*
X^ >. 0 for i = 1, n
X. <. Kj for some i
i i
= 1
where r* is the desired rate of return on the portfolio 
and all other symbols have the same definitions as in the 
first section of this chapter. The portfolio found with 
flO 2 this model is Markowitz efficient if and only if ---- > 0.
dr*
Life companies may have made different portfolio choices 
because the parameters in the above model change through 
time, the parameters are heterogeneous across companies 
at a point in time, and the perceptions of different 
managements, even given the same environment and infor­
mation, may not be homogeneous.
For illustrative purposes, assume a LIC chooses 
among the following five securities:
1. bonds,
2. government insured mortgages,
3. conventional mortgages,
4. preferred stock, and,
5. common stock,
and that these securities have the following return vector 
and variance-covariance matrix:
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R1 4.0 3.0 3.0984 3.0984 3.0984 5.4222
R2 5.0 3.0984 5.0 4.0 4.0 7.0
R = R3 = 5.5 V = 3.0984 4.0 5.0 4.0 7.0
R4 6.0 3.0984 4.0 4.0 5.0 7.0
R5 10.0 5.4222 7.0 7.0 7.0 20.0
Assume the company has legal maximum proportions of assets 
on conventional mortgages of 40 percent, on preferred 
stock of 4 percent, and on common stock of 10 percent, 
and that the company wants a 5.5 percent return on assets. 
Since all three legal constraints are binding at this 
desired rate of return, the portfolio weights minimizing 
the variance for this return are found by minimizing this 
Lagrange function:
5 5 5 *
l = y y x.x.o.. + x ( y x r. - r ) 1 1 13 1 iil i i
5
+ ^2( J Xi - 1) + X3(x3 - .40) + X4(x4 - .04)
+ X_(x,. - .10) (12)5 D
The system of ten partial derivatives of (12) with respect 
to five X.’s and five X's is given as follows:
62
“11 • • • “15 R1 1 0 0 0 X 1 0
• • ♦ R2 1 0 0 0 X2 0
• • • R3 1 1 0 0 X3 0
• • • R4 1 0 1 0 X4 0
2a51 • • • “55 R5 1 0 0 1 X 5 0
R1 R2 R3 R4 E5 0 0 0 0 0 • X1 = * r (13)
1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 • X2 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X3 .40
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 X4 .04
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 X5 .10I -
or A • B = c. in matrix notation. (14)
Since A is square and nonsingular, its inverse exists. 
Pre-multiplying both sides of (14) by A-"*" yields the 
solution vector
-1B = A C (15)
The first five elements of vector B are the proportions 
of total assets in each of the five securities.
X1 .24
X2 .22
X = X3 = .40 legal constraint
X4 .04 legal constraint
X5 .10 legal constraint
By holding the security proportions X, the LIC achieves 
the minimum possible variance, given its desired rate of 
return, non-negativity constraints, legal constraints. 
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and balance sheet constraint. Of course, in this example, 





This risk-return combination is one point on the efficiency 
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a relaxation of the legal constraints would result in a
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portfolio with less variance for the desired rate of 
return.
In general, a relaxation of a binding legal con­
straint will shift the efficiency frontier downward 
(rightward), permitting portfolios with less variance 
for a given return and more return for a given variance. 
In the chance-constrained model, this shift of the 
efficiency frontier will result in the LICs choosing a 
riskier, higher return portfolio with the same proba­
bility of insolvency. Of course, relaxation of a binding 
legal constraint on a risky asset results in the LICs 
holding more of that asset.
Changes in the expected return of a security 
in the return vector or in an element in the variance­
covariance matrix might shift the efficiency frontier as 
well. If the expected return increases (decreases) on 
a security which is positively held, the efficiency 
frontier will shift rightward (leftward). Of course, 
in the chance-constrained model, a rightward shift of the 
efficiency frontier will cause the life company to choose 
a higher return, riskier portfolio. With the variance­
covariance matrix unchanged, the portfolio shifts caused 
by an increase in the expected return of a single security 
are complex. As the LIC moves to a riskier, higher return 
portfolio and if the changed return is for a high return 
security, the LIC would probably hold more of that security.
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But, if the change in return is on a low return security, 
the LIC may use the increased rate of return from the low 
return security to offset the additional risk of invest­
ing more of its assets in riskier securities. The yield 
on a given security is not necessarily positively related 
to the demand for that security, ceteris paribus.in 
the chance-constrained model, the life company's risk­
taking capacity is positively related to its surplus and 
expected rate of return on total assets and negatively 
related to the rate it pays on its liabilities. If the 
portfolio weights were unchanged, an increase in the rate 
of return on one security would increase the portfolio 
rate of return and the variance would remain constant.
However, as the LIC shifts to a higher variance portfolio, 
this may mean holding either more or less of the security 
whose yield increased.
A decrease (increase) in a variance or covariance 
parameter will shift the efficiency frontier downward 
(upward) if the change involves a security positively 
held, and will cause the LIC to choose a riskier, higher
^The condition where the demand for a security 
is negatively related to its yield has analogues in other 
areas of economic theory, such as the Giffin commodity, 
the backward-bending supply curve of labor, and the target 
savings hypothesis. This situation might exist if the 
yield on fixed income securities increased, ceteris paribus 
and life insurance companies purchased less fixed income 
securities and more equities. A simple proof of this 
portfolio shift, as well as the other shifts discussed in 
the remainder of Chapter III, is given in Appendix III. 
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return portfolio. The demand for a particular security 
may be either positively or negatively related to its own 
variance or covariance with another security.
The impact of simultaneous changes in several, 
or perhaps all, parameters of the return vector and 
variance-covariance matrix could be found in addition to 
the partial effects of a single change. For^example, all 
yields could be increased by a constant amount with the 
variance-covariance matrix constant, resulting in a 
parallel rightward shift of the investment opportunity 
set and efficiency frontier, as long as no constraints 
are operating. This, in turn, will cause the LIC to choose 
a riskier, higher return portfolio and to shift toward 
relatively riskier types of securities.
By decreasing the square roots of all the terms 
in the variance-covariance matrix by a constant pro­
portion, with the return vector given, a second type of 
change would be effected which would result in a downward 
shift of the efficiency frontier. The LIC will, then, 
shift to a higher return, riskier portfolio and will shift 
toward the relatively more risky types of securities.
The assumption that relationships between risk and 
return are homogeneous of degree one could produce another 
possible set of changes. Each term of the return vector 
and variance-covariance matrix increases (or decreases) 
in the same proportion. Any risk-return combination in the 
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opportunity set or on the efficiency frontier will be 
shifted (on a ray through the origin) a distance pro­
portionally farther from the origin than the combination 
previously was located. The LIC will choose a higher 
risk, higher return portfolio, but since the preference 
function has a positive vertical intercept (and smaller 
slope than a ray from the origin to the intersection of 
the preference function and efficiency frontier), it will 
shift toward relatively less risky types of securities. 
Many further shifts are possible but will not be enumer­
ated.
Relaxation of binding legal constraints will result 
in heavier investment in the affected types of securities. 
The portfolio shifts induced by changes in expected 
returns or variances or covariances depend upon the specific 
situation.
The Preference Subsystem
Risk-aversion and risk-taking capacity
The risk-return choices a LIC would be willing 
to consider depend on the amount of the company's surplus, 
its contractual obligations to policyholders, and manage­
ment’s degree of risk-aversion. Prior to evaluating the 
sensitivity of LICs’ portfolio preferences to these varia­
bles, the function of portfolio risk and return to the 
Lie’s obligation to its policyholders must be specified.
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The economic obligation of a LIC to its ordinary
life policyholders is easily established. At the time a 
policy is issued the premium A is found by discounting 
the stream of expected death benefits and the stream of 
expected premiums back at the discount rate k, setting 
the present value of expected death benefits equal to the 
c present value of expected premiums, and solving for A.
n
t=0
m.F nt - y
A(l- 1. m )
_ _____u.. - o (16)ti0 (l+kjb
where:
mfc = conditional probability that a policyholder 
dies in period t, given that he was alive 
at t=0, the time the policy was issued.
n
m_. = 0 and V m, = 1.° t=0
F = face value of the policy. F is paid to the 
policyholder's estate at the end of the 
period in which he dies.
A = annual level premium paid at the beginning of 
each period by all living policyholders.
k = discount rate used to set premiums.
^See Robert Cissell and Helen Cissell, Mathematics 
of Finance (3rd ed.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1969), pp. 280-82, and Floyd S. Harper and Lewis C. Workman 
Fundamental Mathematics of Life Insurance (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1970), pp. 219-22.
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NCFt = expected net cash flow between the LIC 
and the policyholder at time t. NCFt 
equals the expected premium less the 
expected death benefit at time t.
m^F = the expected death benefit on a policy 
at time t.
t
(1- y m ) = the probability of the'policyholder 
u=0 u
being alive at time t.
t
A • (1 - I m ) = the expected premium payment 
u=0 u
at time t.
After the policy is in effect, the equality between 
the present value of expected death benefits and the present 
value of expected premiums is disturbed. At 0<s<n, 
t
n m F n A(l- L m )
V —-  - y ------—— =
t=s+l d+k)t t=s+l d+k)12 
t
6See Cissell, pp. 289-93, and Harper, pp. 244-51.
s m F s A(l- y m )
- y —-—? + y u=0 <17)
t=o (1+k) t=Q (l+k)1^
- 6Multiplying both sides of the expression by (1+k) yields 6*
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t
n m.F n A(l- y m )t y u=0 u =
t=s+l (l+k)t-s t=s+l (l+k)t-s
s t
y [A(l- y m„) - m.F] (l+k)s (18)
t=0 u=0 u
Obviously, at time s, the present value of future death 
benefits minus the present value of future premiums 
equals the sum of all net cash flows up to and including 
time s compounded to time s at the rate k. The deficiency 
of the present value of future death benefits is the life 
company’s legal reserves, its contractual obligations 
resulting from its life insurance policies. The legal 
reserves seen in equation (18) also equal all previous 
net cash flows compounded forward to the present. If 
these net cash flows were invested in assets which earned 
a rate of return greater than k, the company would have 
assets exceeding its liabilities. If the assets earned 
less than k, the company’s surplus would be diminishing, 
perhaps becoming negative (the company is insolvent).
At any time s, the company's obligations to its 
policyholders in the next period will be (1+k) times its 
current legal reserves. This is not to say that legal 
reserves at time s + 1 are 1+k times current legal 
reserves, since additional premiums will be received and
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insurance portfolio
enables the company to fulfill its obligations to its
policyholders by investing the net cash flows from policy-
holders at a return of at least that rate used to set the
relationship between the life company's obligations to
relationships among
the variables S(LR), a(Z), k, r, or o and solvency are clear.












in that period, the
-NCF ,S+1
its policyholders and solvency, the
premiums on the policies. Thus, having established the
7 This
company remains solvent. The life
LR (l+k) - LR ns s+1
m . ,F
A(1~ u^O mu> 
(l+k)
n 
lr (i+k)= y 
t=s+l




death benefits disbursed. In period s+1, LRs+17- NCFs+i = (l+k)LRg. If the company's assets in the 
next period exceed its obligations
m ) ________ u 
(l+k)t-s 
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Fig. 3-2.—Probability Distribution of ------^2tl
Assets t
To the left of the point (l+k)LR = (1+k)(1—S) in 
Figure 3-2, the life company is insolvent. If r is nor­
mally distributed and (1-a) is the probability of insol­
vency management is willing to risk, the probability 
distribution of Figure 3-2 is a hypothetical distribution 
of (1+r) such that the probability of failure is exactly 
(1-a). This same probability of failure will exist for 
any distribution with a (1+r) exactly Zo greater than 
(l+k)LR. Any particular risk-return combination where 
this is true corresponds to a point on the preference 
function o = - (S-kLR ) + ^ r in Figure 3-1.
Z u Z
Sensitivity of the model to 
parameter changes
Given the opportunity set and corresponding 
efficiency frontier in Figure 3-1, it is easy to see the 
effect on the optimal portfolio J, if the parameters in 
the preference set changed. An increase in S or a 
decrease in k causes a parallel upward shift in
TH
0 = 1 (S-kLR.) + - r such that the LIC maximizes its 
Z t z
rate of return subject to its constraints at a new o - r 
combination on the efficiency frontier with a higher 
return than at point J. A decrease in a (management's 
preference for solvency) decreases Z and the slope of 
a = (1-kLR.) + i r becomes more positive, rotating
through the point (-S + kLR, 0). A decrease in a would 
also result in a portfolio with higher risk and return. 
As long as the frontier of the preference set intersects 
the efficiency frontier EF (where 50_ > A): 
dr Z
d a 














< 0 dr dLR < 0 since LR = 1 - S




An increase in the current surplus, ceteris paribus 
means that current assets are higher relative to the life 
company's obligations in the next period. Consequently, 
the life company can invest in a slightly riskier, higher 
15
return portfolio and have the same probability of remaining 
solvent. An increase in the rate a life company pays on 
its reserves (k), ceteris paribus, raises its obligations 
in the next period compared to current assets. The life 
company would shift to a slightly less risky, lower return 
portfolio to maintain the same probability of solvency. 
If management wishes to raise the probability of solvency 
(lower the probability of insolvency), ceteris paribus, 
it can do so by shifting to a less risky, lower return 
portfolio. These conclusions necessarily follow whenever 
the preference function intersects the efficiency frontier, 
providing the slope of the efficiency frontier is greater 
than the slope of the preference function if there are two 
intersections.
If o = i (S - kLR,) + i r does not intersect the Z t Z
efficiency frontier but falls below it in Figure 3-1, 
the intersection of the preference set and the opportunity 
set is the null set. This result is, of course, absurd 
for a life company holding assets. Management will lower 
the probability of solvency until a real solution is 
obtainable. If o = | (S - kLR^) + r passes above the 
efficiency frontier, management will choose the highest 
return portfolio in the opportunity set, which is the 
highest return portfolio on the efficiency frontier 
(point F). In this case, minor changes in the parameters 
of the preference function will not alter the portfolio
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until the parameters of the preference function intersect 
the efficiency frontier below F.
Limitations and Extensions of 
the Chance-Constrained Model 
Any model can be criticized on the quality of 
the parameters in the model, on the particular endogenous 
and exogenous variables included or excluded, from the model, 
and on the appropriateness of the model compared to alter­
native models.
Limitations of the model
In this chapter, LICs are presumed to possess 
assets of a given market value which they can currently 
apportion, subject to constraints, such that the market 
value of these assets in the next period has a high, 
subjectively chosen probability of exceeding the company’s 
obligations at that time. The portfolio choices made by 
management within this model depend on their perceptions 
of the relevant parameters. Faced with the same set of 
information, managements of different LICs will not have 
homogeneous ex ante expectations of expected yields and 
variances and covariances among yields. Likewise, while 
a legal limit may be clearly specified, management may 
consider an operational constraint either less than or 
greater than the legal standard. In addition, the measure­
ment of surplus may not be uniform across companies.
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Heterogeneity in the perceptions of parameters will lead 
to more variety in LIC portfolios.
Possible extensions of the model
The basic model developed in the first three 
sections of this chapter can be expanded by adding addi­
tional constraints.
Policy loans were not included in the model since 
they are made at the discretion of the policyholders, 
not the management; nevertheless, they can be included 
by adding them as an additional constraint. Hypothesizing 
that policy loans are a given quantity, one could add the 
necessary return and variance-covariance parameters, 
and then have management maximize its rate of return sub­
ject to this and other constraints.
As mentioned in Chapter II, LICs as a whole do 
not appear to have had liquidity problems, even in the 
face of severe general economic crisis; therefore, liquid­
ity constraints were not considered in the model. If 
relevant, however, an additional deterministic or pro-
g 
babilistic liquidity constraint could be included. 
Management may specify a level of liquid funds it wishes 
to exceed a high, subjectively chosen fraction of the
®For an example of a liquidity chance-constraint 
applied to commercial banks, see Joel Fried, "Bank Port­
folio Selection," Journal of Finance and Quantitative 
Analysis, V, No. 2 (June, 1970), 203-27.
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time. These liquid funds would be the cash realizable 
by liquidating the portfolio in the next period and 
would constitute its existing assets plus the expected 
appreciation less the costs of liquidating the portfolio. 
The level of liquid funds the company wishes in the next 
period will be chosen by management to reflect its pro­
jected cash needs. Since regulations tend to force LICs 
to buy a fairly conservative, marketable portfolio, the 
addition of a liquidity constraint on top of legal con­
straints could be redundant.
Several other important variables are easily 
incorporated into the model. Operating expenses can be 
included by considering them a cash outflow in the next 
period; loads on policies result in a larger cash inflow 
in future periods. A favorable (unfavorable) mortality 
experience causes a lower (higher) cash outflow for 
death benefits and a higher (lower) cash inflow from policy-' 
holder premiums in the next period. Cash surrenders and 
increases in policy loans do not alter the basic objective 
of maximizing the value of assets, subject to constraints, 
but would affect the level of liquid funds desired by 
management in a subsequent period.
As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the 
chance-constrained model developed here is sufficiently 
general that additional variables and other considerations 
can be introduced by adding additional constraints. This 
model is useful because of its direct empirical content 
and should be compared with alternative single-period 
or multiple-period portfolio models.
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Comparisons with other portfolio models
One alternative single-period model to the chance- 
constrained model developed here is the Markowitz model 
which defines an infinite set of efficient portfolios 
along the efficiency frontier. The tangency between 
the efficiency frontier and the highest indifference 
curve (defined in mean-variance space) finds the optimal 
portfolio which maximizes the economic unit's utility.
The basic difficulty is empirically relating the economic 
variables relevant for LIC portfolio decisions to the 
parameters of the utility function. While discussing a 
similar problem, one writer says
However, the generality which made the model 
attractive for theoretical purposes may make it 
next to useless for practical application. It 
is hard to imagine a business consultant beginning 
his work by asking the company president to state 
his preferences over a set of stochastic processes. 
Should this happen, the president could, with some 
justification, reply that he does not know how 
such preferences could be expressed in a consis­
tent manner, and he might also demonstrate that he 
knows very well how to express his opinion of 
certain consultants.9
qKarl Henrik Borch. The Economics of Uncertainty 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1968) , p. 181.
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The measurability of most of the parameters of the chance- 
constrained model makes it attractive for empirical work.
Another single-period model to which the chance-
constrained model can be compared is Baumol's expected 
gain-confidence limit model.Baumol defines an efficient 
portfolio as one where there is a tradeoff between expected 
return (E) and the lower confidence limit (L) associated 
with that return. L = E - ka, k subjectively determined.
^51 = 1 - k when S2- > i . The Baumol (E,L) criterion 
dE 3e k
excludes all portfolios on the Markowitz 
frontier below the point where = i .
SB E 
would have to be defined to choose among 
(E,a) efficiency
A utility function 
the portfolios
which are Baumol (E,L) efficient. An expected gain­
confidence limit model presents the same basic problem 
that the Markowitz model presents: empirically relating 
life insurance company parameters to a utility function.
A third single-period model which could have been 
used assumes that the economic unit can borrow and lend 
at a constant risk-free rate. The optimal portfolio is 
that portfolio on the efficiency frontier which is at the 
tangency between the efficiency frontier and a ray from
^William J. Baumol, "An Expected Gain-Confidence 
Limit Criterion for Portfolio Selection," Management 
Science, X (October, 1963), 174-82.
81
the risk-free rate.11 In Figure 3-3, r is the risk- 
F
^William F. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Prices: A 
Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk," 
Journal of Finance, XIX (September, 1964), 425-42, and 
John Lintner, "The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selec­
tion of Risky Investments in Stock Portfolios and Capital 
Budgets,” Review of Economics and Statistics, XLVII 
(February, 1965), 13-37.
free rate, r. and a are the return and risk on assets, A A
and rg and ag are the return and risk on surplus due to 
borrowing at the risk-free rate rF.
Fig. 3-3.—Sharpe-Lintner Portfolio Model
The economic unit borrows or lends at this risk-free rate 
and maximizes its utility where an indifference curve is 
tangent to the ray instead of where the indifference 
curve is tangent to the efficiency frontier. Increases 
in the risk-free rate, ceteris paribus, cause the economic 
unit to choose a riskier higher return portfolio and, 
conversely, decreases in the risk-free rate cause it 
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to choose a less risky, lower return portfolio. In this 
model, changes in the debt/equity or debt/asset ratios 
have no impact on the composition of the optimal port­
folio; in the chance-constrained model, however, changes 
in the relative amount of surplus, ceteris paribus, 
result in the choice of a different portfolio. In the 
Sharpe-Lintner model, an increase in the risk-free rate 
would result in the choice of a riskier portfolio; this 
is the opposite of the shift which occurs in the chance- 
constrained model. With a positive risk-free rate, the 
portfolio shift prescribed by the Sharpe-Lintner model 
increases the probability of insolvency.
Without specifying the utility function, the con­
cept of stochastic dominance can be applied to the same 
parameter shifts which have been examined in this chapter. 
Second-degree stochastic dominance applies to all concave 
12 (risk-averse) utility functions. If the integral of the 
cumulative density function of the random variable (rates 
of return) for one portfolio choice is less than the same 
integral for another choice over the interval from the 
lowest possible return to any other arbitrary value, 
then the former choice is preferred by any risk-averse 
economic unit. If a change occurs which shifts the cumu­
lative density function of possible returns such that the
12Josef Hadar and William R. Russell, "Rules for 
Ordering Uncertain Prospects," American Economic Review, 
LIX (March, 1969), 25-34.
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cumulative probability of any arbitrary return is less 
than the previous cumulative probability for the same 
return, then this change allows the economic unit to 
move to a higher level of utility. It follows that a 
relaxation of a binding legal constraint or an increase 
in the yield on a security positively held would allow 
a life insurance company to move to a higher, level of 
utility and a higher expected rate of return. The concept 
of stochastic dominance is sufficiently general that the 
portfolio shifts accompanying parameter changes are not 
necessarily determinable and the rate paid on reserves 
and the amount of surplus cannot explicitly be included 
in the analysis.
The life insurance investment process could be 
described with a multiple-period model instead of a single­
period one since the portfolio problems are, in fact, 
13dynamic. In addition to the parameters of the single­
period model, it would be necessary to make many assump­
tions, such as correlations among security yields between 
time periods, dividends, surrenders, policy loan exten­
sions and repayments. The use of a multiple-period model 
instead of a single-period model would greatly magnify
13 See Jan Mossin, "Optimal Multiperiod Portfolio 
Policies," The Journal of Business, XLI (April, 1968), 
215-29, and Nils H. Hakansson, "Multi-period Mean-Variance 
Analysis: Toward a General Theory of Portfolio Choice," 
Journal of Finance, XXVI (September, 1971), 857-84.
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the parameter estimation problem since ex ante yields and 
covariances might be needed for any two points in time 
within the time horizon used. A dynamic model might be 
so simple that it has no clear advantage over a one- 
period model, or so complex that it does not generate 
easily testable hypotheses. Since the purpose of this 
theoretical model is to provide empirically testable 
hypotheses, it is unclear that a more sophisticated ana­
lytical model would provide more useful hypotheses.
Summary
The chance-constrained model suggests several 
relationships between the portfolios chosen by LICs and 
other economic variables. The following situations should 
result in a shift toward greater investment in riskier 
securities: an increase in surplus, a decrease in the 
rate promised on legal reserves, an increase in manage­
ment's willingness to risk insolvency, and a relaxation 
of a binding legal constraint on a risky asset. While no 
general statement of the effect of changes in expected 
returns or risks of particular securities is possible, 
a statistical analysis of the impact of changes in yield 
differentials and levels on portfolio selections is easily 
accomplished. An econometric study of some of these 
suggested economic relationships is the subject of 
Chapter IV.
CHAPTER IV
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF LIFE 
INSURANCE PORTFOLIO BEHAVIOR
The chance-constrained portfolio model suggests sev­
eral hypotheses about life insurance portfolio behavior which 
are examined in this chapter. To this end, Chapter IV ex­
plains the selection of the sample of life insurance compan­
ies, defines the relevant variables for analysis, explains 
the specific hypotheses to be tested, and presents a variety 
of cross-sectional/time-series regression results necessary 
to test these hypotheses. A simple ordinary least squares 
model supplemented by a least-squares dummy-variable model 
is used to study the role of the amount of surplus, the loca­
tion of a company’s charter, and the general level of finan­
cial yields. Next, these basic results are extended by con­
sidering the effects of relative yields and company size on 
portfolio choices. Also, tests of homogeneity between U. S. 
and Canadian companies are performed.
A variety of statistical techniques are employed in 
addition to the static ordinary least squares and least­
squares dummy-variable models. A first-order autoregressive 
scheme is integrated into the least-squares dummy-variable 
model to moderate simultaneously for the effects of auto­
correlation and interfirm variation. Both the Koyck and
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Almon distributed lag techniques are used to study the dynam­
ics of portfolio adjustments to changes in the independent 
variables. The Koyck model is estimated in a form which ad­
justs for autocorrelation since, in this case, the autocorre­
lation would cause biased results. The Almon model is parti­
cularly interesting here since it permits different distri­
buted lags for each independent variable. These econometric 
techniques are the basis for several conclusions about the 
behavior of life insurance investments and the performance of 
the industry as a whole; in addition, these results combine 
with the theoretical analysis of Chapter III to give signifi­
cant implications for financial econometric research in other 
areas.
The Companies in the Sample
The basis for the statistical tests in a pooled, 
cross-sectional/time-series sample of 104 large United States 
and Canadian life insurance companies possessing complete an­
nual data for 1957-71.1 The selection procedure was as fol­
lows :
1. All companies in the 1972 volume of Best’s In­
surance Reports: Life-Health Edition with assets exceeding 
$190.0 million were isolated. This set contained 130 com­
panies ranging in size from $31.16 billion (Prudential) to




2. Thirteen companies lacking complete data going 
back to 1957 were dropped from the sample, thus reducing the 
sample to 117 companies.
3. Thirteen more companies with assets less than 
$75.0 million on December 31, 1957, were dropped from the 
sample, reducing it to 104 companies.
The statistical analysis focuses on the largest com­
panies for two simple reasons: an analysis of the large com­
panies has more significance for aggregate industry behavior 
and, in addition, the smaller companies exhibit wider var­
iances in portfolio behavior, perhaps because they are too 
small to diversify economically and because they have more 
limited managerial resources.
This sample includes 12 companies with Canadian 
charters and 92 with charters from various U. S. states. Nine 
companies are chartered in New York state and 41 companies 
are licensed to sell insurance in New York (63 are not). 
Fifty-eight of the companies are stock companies and 46 are 
mutuals. Since there were 1805 companies in the U. S. and
281 in Canada in 1971, this sample includes only about 5.5 per­
cent of the universe of companies from which the sample is 
drawn. However, as can be seen in Table 4-1, these 104 com­
panies hold 91.60 percent of all assets held by the U. S. and
Institute of Life Insurance, 1972 Life Insurance 
Fact Book (New York: Institute of Life Insurance, 1972), 
p. 87 and p. 103.
INVESTMENTS OF 104 U.S. AND CANADIAN COMPANIES, DECEMBER 31, 1971
TABLE 4-1
(1)









Proportion of Total 
Assets For Sample
Bonds 95,744* .4119** 83,699* .3931**
Mortgages 82,275 . 3540 75,766 . 3559
Bonds and Mortgages 178,019 . 7659 159,465 . 7490
Common Stock U/A N/A 9,507 .0447
Preferred Stock N/A N/A 3,304 .0155
Total Stock 16,005 .0689 12,830 .0603
Real Estate 7,780 .0335 6,825 .0321
Policy Loans 18,252 .0785 16,460 .0773
Total Assets 232,418 212,900
Source: Institute of Life Insurance, 1972 Life Insurance Fact Book. (New York: 
Institute of Life Insurance, 1972). 
* Millions of dollars. Column does not sum to total assets because of omission of 
miscellaneous assets.
* *Column does not sum to unity because of omission of miscellaneous assets.
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Canadian life companies. (The 117 companies remaining after 
step 2 held $215,960 billion in assets; this was 92.92 per­
cent of all assets held by U. S. and Canadian LICs. The com­
parable figures for the 130 companies in step 1 were $221,190 
billion and 95.17 percent).
Most of the statistical analysis of this chapter will 
be performed on the set of 92 large U. S. companies, thus ex­
cluding the 12 Canadian companies. These firms include 52 
stock companies and 40 mutuals; 9 companies with New York 
charters and 83 companies chartered in other states; 39 com­
panies licensed to sell in New York and 53 companies without 
this license. As seen in Table 4-2, these 92 companies held 
91.85 percent of all assets held by U. S. life companies on 
December 31, 1971.
Definitions of Variables and Theoretical 
Implications for Coefficient Signs
Having described the sample, this section defines the 
relevant variables and outlines the hypotheses to be tested. 
The six dependent variables to be analyzed are:
= bonds/total assets
= mortgages/total assets
F  B M
TA TA TA fixed assets/total assets
CS
TA common stock/total assets












Proportion of Total 
Assets For Sample
Bonds 89,435* .4168** 78,411* .3978**
Mortgages 75,409 .3514 69,774 . 3540
Bonds and Mortgages 164,844 . 7682 148,185 .7518
Common Stock 10,363 .0483 8,450 .0429
Preferred Stock 3,745 .0175 3,108 .0158
Total Stock 14,108 .0657 11,568 .0587
Real Estate 6,880 .0321 6,006 .0305
Policy Loans 17,065 .0795 15,385 .0781
Total Assets 214,579 197,090
Source: Institute of Life Insurance, 1972 Life Insurance Fact Book. (New York:
Institute of Life Insurance, 1972).
Millions of dollars, 
miscellaneous assets.
Column does not sum to total assets because of omission of
Column does not sum to unity because of omission of miscellaneous assets. o
= preferred stock/total assets
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TS CS PS = total stock/total assets
These dependent variables are the proportion of total assets 
invested in different types of securities. Further disagre- 
gation was not fruitful, perhaps because Markowitz-type diver­
sification is not significant in the face of extremely high 
correlations among yields on fixed income securities. Bonds 
and mortgages may be such nearly perfect (Markowitz) substi- 
Ftutes that the sum can be predicted more accurately than 
either of its components. The dependent variables were 
chosen as proportions instead of dollars because of the pre­
sence of heteroskedasticity: if the dependent variables were 
measured in dollars instead of proportions, the error terms 
would systematically be larger for large companies than for 
small, resulting in inefficient estimators.
The following explanatory variables are considered:
= (surplus + security valuation reserve)/total 
assets
YC = yield on corporate bonds
YM = yield on mortgages
YP = yield on preferred stock
SD = 1 if company is a stock company
= 0 if company is a mutual




NC = 1 if company is chartered in New York 
= 0 otherwise
TA = total assets in millions of dollars
The chance-constrained portfolio model generates sev­
eral testable hypotheses about the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variables which are 
summarized in Table 4-3.
The signs in the cells of Table 4-3 indicate whether 
a direct (+) or inverse (-) relationship is expected between 
two variables in the chance-constrained model. The predicted 
signs are not advanced as a universal case for any parameters 
inserted in the chance-constrained model, but as signs which 
could be predicted based on assumptions about the modern eco­
nomic and institutional environment in which life insurance 
companies make their decisions. Of the dependent variables, 
it is assumed here that common and preferred equities are 
riskier investments than bonds and mortgages. The following 
discussion explains how each of the independent variables 
should effect the demand for the various asset groups used 
as dependent variables. Subsequently, econometric techniques 
are used to test these hypotheses about the relationships sum­
marized in Table 4-3.
Since the relative quantity of surplus is positively 
related to the risk-taking capacity of the life insurance com­
pany, the higher is, the more equities and less fixed in­
come securities the company should hold. With more surplus.
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the company can invest more aggressively in riskier types of 
assets and maintain at least the same probability of solvency.
Yields are treated in two ways. First, the corpor­
ate bond yield is treated as a proxy for the ex ante yields 
of all financial assets since all yields are assumed highly 
correlated. An increase in the level of all yields (seen 
through an increase in YC) should cause a marginal shift away 
from fixed-income securities and towards riskier, higher- 
yielding equities. Second, relative yields expressed as ra­
tios are used to explain portfolio shifts. In the chance- 
constrained model, the demand for a security is not necessar- 
3 ily positively related to its own yield. However, if bonds 
and mortgages are assumed to be substitutes, the coefficient 
YMof yq should be negative m the bond equations and positive 
in the mortgage equations. Finally, if the demand for pre­
ferred stock is sensitive to relative yields, the coefficient 
YPof should be positive m the preferred stock equations. 
Although the chance-constrained model contains no 
information about how different legal forms of organization
It is interesting to note that William L. Silber as- 
summed a priori that the demand for a security is positively 
related to its own yield. The agreement of signs with these 
expectations was one criterion Silber used to choose among 
alternative structural equations. See his Portfolio Behavior 
of Financial Institutions: An Empirical Study with Implica­
tions for Monetary Policy, Interest-Rate Determination, and 
Financial Model Building (New York: Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc., 1970) and "Portfolio Substitutability, Regula­
tions, and Monetary Policy," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
LXXXIII (May, 1969), 196-219.
95 
should behave, two significant interpretations can be given 
to the signs of the stock dummy in a regression. Given the 
other independent variables, positive (negative) coefficients 
of the stock dummy in equity equations and negative (positive) 
coefficients in an equation for total fixed assets would in­
fer that stock life insurance companies were less (more) risk 
averse than mutuals. A second interpretation of the stock 
dummy is based on a general difference between the life in­
surance products sold by stock and mutual companies. Life 
insurance policies sold by stock companies generally have 
lower premiums and higher assumed rates of return on policy 
reserves than policies issued by mutual companies. As estab­
lished in Chapter III, this difference would cause stock com­
panies to invest in a lower return, less risky portfolio, 
ceteris paribus. If future investment and mortality exper­
ience warrants it, the stock company will pay dividends to 
its stockholders and the mutual will pay dividends to its 
policy-holders. However, a stock company with lower premium 
rates and a higher assumed rate of return must invest more in 
fixed income securities and less in equities, given its de­
gree of risk aversion and surplus. This second interpretation 
of the stock dummy provides an economic basis for predicting 
more conservative portfolios for stock companies.
Historically, New York has possessed the tightest 
regulations on portfolio choices of life companies, a situa­
tion which may affect the coefficients of the New York li­
cense or charter dummies. If the portfolio limitations are
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binding and companies licensed to sell in New York are regula­
ted as tightly as those chartered there, the coefficients of 
NL should be significantly negative for the affected types of 
securities and the coefficients of NC should not be signifi­
cant, since companies chartered in New York are a subset of 
those licensed to sell in that state. If the regulations are 
not equally stringent on both sets of companies, their impact 
on New York licensed companies chartered elsewhere is the co­
efficient of NL and their impact on New York chartered compan­
ies is the sum of the coefficients of NL and NC. If these li­
mitations have been binding in the chance-constrained model. 
New York regulated companies should possess lower proportions 
of equities and, perhaps, conventional mortgages than LICs 
immune to New York laws, ceteris paribus. Hence, if the le­
gal constraints are binding, the coefficients of NL and/or 
CS PS TSNC should be negative in regressions having =7-, and XZx l/i
as dependent variables. The effect of the constraint on 
mortgages is ambiguous because FHA and VA mortgages (which 
are not restricted) may substitute for conventional mortgages 
and because of regional biases toward mortgages. If the pre­
dicted signs on the dummies do not appear, this would infer 
that the New York constraints on that asset were not binding.
Total assets (or some transformation of TA) can be 
included as an independent variable in order to measure the 
effect of company size on the demand for different types of 
securities. This coefficient would detect differences in 
the behavior of the large or small companies. Of course.
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the chance-constrained model does not predict the signs of 
the coefficients of size variables since the model neglects 
the scale of life companies.
Statistical Techniques
At this point it should be useful to outline briefly 
the specific econometric techniques used in this chapter to 
test hypotheses about the economic behavior of life insurance 
portfolios.
The most elementary models are ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regressions which attempt to explain the portfolio 
choices among the six dependent variables (bonds, mortgages, 
total bonds and mortgages, common stock, preferred stock, and 
total stock) as functions of the relative amount of surplus, 
the overall yield level, and dummies for the stock form of 
organization, a New York license, and a New York charter. 
Because much of the total variation of each dependent vari­
able is interfirm variance, a least-squares dummy-variable 
(LSDV) model, which utilizes company dummies to eliminate be­
tween firm variation, is adopted subsequently. In the LSDV 
model, the stock, NY license, and NY charter dummies must be 
dropped since these dummies are linearly dependent with the 
company dummies. Aitkens generalized least squares estima­
tors provide a potentially more efficient method of pooling 
cross-sectional/time-series data than either the OLS or LSDV 
approaches, but generalized least squares is not used here 
since, as will be shown below, the LSDV model should
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approximate closely the efficiency of the generalized least 
squares estimates.
The basic OLS or LSDV models are extended to consider 
some relationships beyond those initially considered. Yield 
ratios are used as independent variables to find if relative 
yields affect the demand for different classes of securities. 
Then, the size of the life insurance company is included to 
measure the impact of the scale of the company on its portfo­
lio choices. Finally, an analysis of covariance test is used 
to test the hypothesis that U. S. and Canadian companies are 
a homogeneous set with respect to the equations estimated in 
this study.
Because of the presence of positive serial correla­
tion, even in the LSDV model, the Hildreth-Lu scanning tech­
nique is used to adjust for first-order autocorrelation. 
While this procedure does not alter substantially the results 
of the empirical tests, it does provide additional insight 
into the behavior of the life insurance companies.
Two distributed lag models are estimated to explore 
the dynamics of the investment behavior. The Koyck distri­
buted lag, which assumes that the impact of the independent 
variables declines exponentially with time, is found with an 
estimating equation which removes autocorrelation because 
the presence of serial correlation leads to inconsistent es­
timators using OLS estimates. In contrast, the presence of 
autocorrelation does not lead to inconsistent estimators when 
using the Almon lag technique. The assumption in the Almon
99 
technique, that the weights of the current and lagged inde­
pendent variables lie on a polynomial, provides for much more 
efficient tests of the impact of these variables, subject, of 
course, to the risk of committing a specification error. The 
Almon model possesses two important advantages over the Koyck 
lag: it permits a more general shape of distributed lags and, 
importantly, it permits a different lag structure for each 
independent variable. This technique provides' significant re­
sults about the dynamic impact of the independent variables.
Each of the above models is explained more complete­
ly in the following sections where it is used. In some cases, 
statistical results which add little to the overall results 




The basic multiple regression results for the six 
pdependent variables estimated as a function of ^■A, YC, the 
dummies SD, NL, and NC (or, alternately, dummies for each 
company) are presented in this section for 92 large U. S. 
companies covering the 1957-71 time period. The OLS model, 
TD presented first, yields significant coefficients for ^rA, YC, 
SD, NL, and NC, but the LSDV model, which includes company 
dummies, yields more highly significant coefficients for the 
yield level and smaller standard errors of the estimate.
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Basic OLS model
The multiple regression results for each of the six
4dependent variables are found in Table 4-4. Ordinary least 
squares estimators have two interesting properties in the mod­
els specified. First, if a particular set of assets is broken 
into mutually exclusive subsets and equations with the same 
explanatory variables are estimated for all of the subsets, 
the sum of the regression coefficients across subsets will 
equal the respective coefficients of the equation for the 
initial set. Also, if total assets are broken into mutually 
exclusive subsets and identical equations are estimated for 
all subsets, the sum of the constants across the equations 
will be unity and the sum of the coefficients of each inde- 
pendent variable across the equations will be zero. Two ex-
Sinceamples of the first identity are found in Table 4-4
BMP mn + = ma for each observation, the sum of the regression
JL XT 1A in
B M coefficients for and for each independent variable 
equals exactly the regression coefficient for the correspond-
. Fmg independent variable for The same statement for
CS PS TS7=^-, Tp^-, and ma" holds only approximately because, in some cases, 1A J. Zi X
TS CSsavings and loan shares were included in mV but not in 7^3 TA TA
4The same regressions for 104 U.S. and Canadian com­
panies are in Appendix IV-4. The results of the 104 company 
sample are virtually identical to those of the 92 company 
sample discussed here.
5The second identity is established by William C. 
Brainard and James Tobin in "Pitfalls in Financial Model 
Building," American Economic Review, LVIII (May, 1968),99-122. 
The first identity necessarily follows from the second one.
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES RESULTS FOR 92 COMPANIES, 1957-71, USING YIELD LEVEL PROXY
TABLE 4-4
Dependent Variables
Independent B M F CS PS PS
Variables TA TA TA TA TA TA
CONSTANT .472438 .512555 .984993 -.037508 -.015625 -.051986
R -.236914 -.542547 -.779461 .502262 .173524 .675536
TA (-5.43)* (-11.53) (-22.60) (32.30) (19.65) (37.27)
YC -.012237 -.007712 -.019948 .003297 .002091 .005341
(-7.97) (-4.65) (-16.43) (6.02) (6.72) (8.37)
SD .001833 .034059 .035892 -.013156 -.002386 -.015996
(.34) (5.81) (8.36) (-6.80) (-2.17) (-7.09)
NL .050153 -.057770 -.007617 .011853 .005940 .017077
(10.09) (-10.76) (-1.94) (6.69) (5.90) (8.26)
NC .005056 .016279 .021335 -.015775 .000720 -.015150
(.65) (1.95) (3.48) (-5.71) (.46) (-4.70)
Std. Error 
of Estimate .0785 .0848 .0621 .0280 .0159 .0326
R2 .1799 .1613 .3838 .4872 .2756 .5594
R2 .1769 .1582 .3816 .4854 .2829 .5578
F-Ratio 60.29 52.83 171.19 261.11 104.53 348.95
* t-statistics are given in parentheses beneath their respective coefficients. —2 .R is the
coefficient of determination corrected for loss of degrees of freedom.
PSor TA* T^e secon<^ identity does not hold exactly since bonds 
mortgages, and equities comprise only 86 percent of total as­
sets, but, nevertheless, the sum of the constants is in the 
neighborhood of unity and the sum of the coefficients of each 
independent variable is in the neighborhood of zero.
Table 4-4 indicates the coefficients of the surplus 
and yield level variables are highly significant and have the 
signs predicted by the chance-constrained model in every case 
RThe most important independent variable is ^rA, which has high 
ly significant t-statistics shown in parentheses. Over the 
time period covered in this study and for the companies in 
this sample, the amount of equity relative to total assets 
appears to be the most important single determinant of the 
structure chosen by large U. S. life insurance companies.
The coefficients of YC also are highly significant for all 
six equations. These results indicate that life companies 
with higher risk-bearing capacities (higher surplus) tend to 
invest more heavily in riskier, higher-return equities and 
less in fixed income securities. In addition, a higher level 
of financial yields, given the amounts of surplus and the 
firms1 liabilities to their policyholders, provides the com­
panies with a similar increase in risk-bearing capacity and 
a significant shift towards riskier types of assets occurs. 
These two hypotheses will be tested further in subsequent 
models.
Since the three dummy variables in Table 4-4 behaved
in a consistent manner in this model and other models
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presented below, the discussion of their role here will ap­
ply to these later models, also. The coefficients of SD con­
tain information about the comparative behavior of mutual and 
stock companies. Given their amount of equity and whether 
they are chartered or licensed in New York, stock companies 
tend to hold less equities (and more fixed income securities) 
than mutual companies. More conservative portfolios were ex­
pected of stock companies in the chance-constrained model be­
cause their premiums are lower and their assumed rates of re­
turn on reserves are higher than mutual firms. Given that 
the other parameters are the same, stock companies must in­
vest in a safer, lower return portfolio to keep the same pro­
bability of solvency. The coefficients of SD could also be 
explained by assuming that stock company managements are more 
risk averse, but no economic basis for such an assumption is 
advanced here. The observed economic differences between 
the life insurance products sold by stock and mutual compan­
ies are consistent with these regression results.
In Table 4-4, the effect of New York regulations 
should appear in the coefficients of NL for those firms li­
censed in New York and NO for those firms chartered in New 
York. Given the other independent variables, companies with 
New York licenses hold significantly more bonds, less mort­
gages, and more common and preferred stock than the unli­
censed companies. The coefficients of NO would indicate dif­
ferences between the New York chartered companies and compan­
ies chartered elsewhere but licensed to sell in New York.
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The New York chartered companies appear to hold more mortgages 
and less common stock. On the other hand, New York regula­
tions have not been binding on the demand for preferred stock. 
Given their surplus, companies chartered in New York tend to 
hold roughly 0.4 percent (.011853-.015775) less of their to­
tal assets in common stock than companies not subject to New 
York regulations. Given their surplus, companies licensed 
and chartered in New York also tend to hold approximately 5 
and 3 percent, respectively, less of their total assets in 
mortgages than companies without New York licenses.
Since these regression results indicate that New 
York regulations on common stock are not binding, some fur­
ther analysis is warranted. Over the 1957-71 time period 
during which the proportion of assets invested in common 
stock increased, limits on common stock holdings in New York 
were raised from the lesser of (a) 5 percent of assets or 
(b) one-half of surplus to exactly double this (10 percent 
of assets or 100 percent of surplus) in 1969. Consequently, 
a prior year such as 1967 is an interesting year to examine 
the slack available to life insurance companies in this in­
vestment category. Table 4-5 shows how heavily the 92 U.S. 
companies invested in common stock compared to their indivi­
dual legal limits (of course, 53 of the companies are not 
subject to these limits). It is obvious that considerable 
slack existed for most companies.
Since the New York regulations are stated in terms
of the acquisition costs of the common stock and not in terms
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MARKET VALUE OF INVESTMENTS IN COMMON STOCK AS 
A FRACTION OF THE NEW YORK LEGAL LIMIT, 1967
TABLE 4-5
Companies Companies Companies
Not Licensed Licensed in Chartered




1.0 and above 19 13 4 36
.8 - 1.0 6 4 0 10
.6 - .8 6 5 0 11
.4 - .6 6 1 0 7
.2 - .4 6 4 2 12
0 - .2 10 3 3 16
Totals 53 30 9 92
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of market value (the valuation procedure used by the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners), Table 4-5 under­
states the amount of slack available to companies owning com­
mon stock which has appreciated in market value after its in­
itial purchase. Since the cost of their stock holdings was 
not available, it was estimated for each firm by assuming 
that the cost and market values coincided in 1957 and then 
cumulating estimated annual net purchases from*1957 forward. 
The estimated net purchase for a year is the year-end market 
value less the previous year's market value adjusted for this 
year's change in Standard Poor's 500 Stock Index. Of course, 
this estimated cost figure used in Table 4-6 is only an at­
tempt to deflate the investment in common stock for the gen­
erally rising prices over the period of this study and would 
be only an approximation of the actual historical cost for 
each company. These figures indicate a significant reluc­
tance on the part of the majority of life insurance companies 
to press the New York legal maximum.
New York regulations do not appear to be binding on 
many firms: most companies appear to maintain a slack ex­
ceeding 40 percent of their legal maximum constraints. While 
some companies may wish to maintain some slack in order to 
appease examiners or, more likely, to maintain the capacity 
to invest more heavily when investment opportunities are bet­
ter, the New York limits simply exceed what many managements 
want to invest. Of course, the restriction of the lessor of 
3 percent of assets or 33 percent of surplus, which existed
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TABLE 4-6
ESTIMATED COST OF INVESTMENTS IN COMMON STOCK AS 














1.0 and above 8 5 0 13
.8 - 1. 0 1 1 2 4
.6 - . 8 4 3 1 8
.4 - . 6 14 9 0 23
.2 - . 4 8 2 1 11
0 - . 2 18 10 5 33
Totals 53 30 9 92
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prior to 1957, would be exceeded by most companies, and the 
5 percent of assets/50 percent of surplus limit, had it not 
been relaxed in 1969, may have proved binding to more firms 
in later years. While New York regulations as a whole, both 
on the general qualitative and quantitative composition of 
the portfolio and on the marketing and characteristics of the 
life insurance product, may have a significant impact, clear­
ly the restriction on common stock is not universally binding.
It is obvious from the interpretation of the regres­
sion coefficients of the six equations in Table 4-4 that life 
companies behave roughly as the chance-constrained model pre­
dicts they should. However, the explanatory power of the six 
equations varies considerably and leaves much portfolio be­
havior among the companies unexplained.
. B MThe equations for =_ and =•,. have the lowest coeffi- TA TA
cients of determination; this was expected since bonds and 
PS better than for a situation which is understandable since 
mortgages tend to be close substitutes. The equation for
F —2their sum, has a higher R and a lower standard error of
B M CSthe estimate than either or The equations for are
J. A 1A in
the legal and economic status of common stock is less ambig-
CS uous than that of preferred stock. The equations for and
TS are the strongest of the six. However, because of consid­
erable between firm variation which is not explained by the 
independent variables, the next section uses a model which 
eliminates these interfirm differences.
Basic LSDV model
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Because the residuals of the OLS model above had non­
zero means for each company in the cross section, a least­
squares dummy-variable (LSDV) model can be utilized to improve 
the efficiency of the estimates. If, as appears to be the 
case above, the OLS model has the structure
Yij ~ a + bXij + uij i = 1, n firms
j = 1, t periods
in which the residuals are
(v and w with zero means and constant variances), the error
associated with each firm, v. can be removed by using com­
pany dummies
w. .Yij - “i + bxij *
leaving only the purely random error w. . The LSDV tech­
nique involves a loss of degrees of freedom and eliminates 
the between firm variation. Ignoring potential sources of 
between firm variation is justifiable here on two grounds.
First, many sources of between firm variation are not modeled 
here because of their complexity or because of the inability 
to ascribe numerical values to them. Second, while some
R cross-sectional variables such as SD, NL, and NC are
highly significant, the LSDV technique helps focus on the
Rwithin firm variation due to covariates such as and YC.
The effect of adding company dummies as independent
variables can be found by comparing the equations from esti­
mating the demand for the six dependent variables using the
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LSDV model in Table 4-7 with the similar equations of Table 
4-4, which was the OLS model. The dummies NL, NC, and SD of 
Table 4-4 are dropped because they would form a singularity 
with the company dummies. Table 4-8 provides a comparison of 
the summary statistics for these equations: the addition of 
company dummies substantially reduces the standard errors; 
the source of most of the unexplained variance in Table 4-4 
is inter-company variation.
B M FFor the equations explaining , and =_ , the ab-
X X A X A
R solute sizes of the and their corresponding t-values were 
reduced. The coefficients for YC were practically unchanged 
and their corresponding t-values substantially increased.
CS PS TSFor the equations explaining and the absolute
XA XA XAp sizes of the coefficients of are substantially the same 
and the t-values are reduced, though still highly significant. 
The absolute sizes of the coefficients of YC are about the 
same and the t-values are larger and more significant.
The use of the LSDV model improved the characteris­
tics of the equations estimating the six dependent variables 
and did not alter the role of the relative amount of surplus 
or the yield level proxy for these variables. The coeffi­
cients of the company dummies, which are not reported in
Table 4-7, exhibited statistically significant differences 
from each other. Analysis of covariance tests can be used
TABLE 4-7
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES RESULTS USING LSDV MODEL 
COEFFICIENTS OF COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
Dependent Variable
Independent B M F CS PS TS
Variables TA TA TA TA TA TA
R -.092088 -.188664 -.280751 .502594 .156236 .654214
TA (-1.68) (-3.67) (-6.67) (27.17) (11.06) (25.65)
YC -.012370 -.008037 -.020408 .003297 .002107 .005361
Std. Error
(-15.95) (-11.05) (-34.33) (12.61) (10.56) (14.88)
of Estimate .0396 .0371 .0304 .0133 .0102 .0184
R2 . 8046 . 8494 .8623 . 8910 .7218 . 8690
R2 .7905 . 8385 . 8524 . 8831 .7016 . 8595
F-Ratio 56.95 78.00 86.62 113.03 35.87 91.70
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T/VBLE 4-8
SUMMARY STATISTICS FROM OLS AND LSDV MODELS
Dependent
Variable Dummies Standard Error
B SD, NL, NC .0785 .1799
TA Co. Dummies .0396 . 8046
M SD, NL, NC .0848 .1613
TA Co. Dummies .0371 . 8494
F SD, NL, NC .0621 .3838
TA Co. Dummies .0304 . 8623
CS SD, NL, NC .0280 .4872
TA Co. Dummies .0133 .8910
PS SD, NL, NC .0159 .2756
TA Co. Dummies .0102 .7218
TS SD, NL, NC .0326 .5594
TA Co. Dummies .0184 . 8690
6 113to show the significance of interfirm variation. Covariance 
analysis is used here to test differences in firm intercepts 
(assuming common slopes), to test differences in firm slopes 
(given different intercepts), and to test overall homogeneity 
of the equations among the firms. The residual sums of 
squares for each dependent variable for three equations using 
p and YC as independent variables are shown in Table 4-9.
The addition of company dummies (different intercepts for 
each firm) to a simple equation with a common intercept and 
common slopes for all firms leads to a highly significant 
reduction in the residual sum of squares, as established by 
the value for F^: the company dummies are not homogeneous. 
Rindicates that the slopes for and YC are not homogen­
eous across firms, given different intercepts. With non- 
homogeneous slopes and intercepts, the overall coefficients 
(for dummies and slopes together) prove non-homogeneous as 
well. While the- hypotheses of the chance-constrained model 
are tested appropriately using common slope coefficients for 
the sample of life insurance companies, statistically sig­
nificant individual differences in behavior exist.
An alternative to the OLS and LSDV models presented 
above is the generalized least squares (GLS) method of pool- 
7 ing cross-sectional/time-series data. The GLS estimator
6
For an explanation of the covariance analysis used 
here, see J. Johnston, Econometric Methods (2nd ed.; New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1972), pp. 192-99.
7G.S. Maddala, "The Use of Variance Components Models 
in Pooling Cross Section and Time Series Data," Econometrica, 
XXXXIX (March, 1971), 341-58.





























































Residual 1377 9.25230 11.31533 5.65307 1.17788 .36248 1.63253
F^: Test of differential 
intercepts 91,1286 55.20 77.76 56.57 64.20 25.12 41.14
F2: Test of differential 
slopes 182,1104 12.34 9.63 16.86 9.93 16.87 15.55
F_: Test of overall 
homogeneity 273,1104 52.19 62.71 68.85 50.76 37.43 49.97
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would have less variance than either the OLS or the LSDV es­
timators used here and thus be more efficient. In this case, 
the estimates would be very close to the LSDV model because 
of the large size of the between group variation compared to 
g the within group variation. The efficiency possible with 
the GLS estimator does not differ appreciably from the LSDV 
estimator in this sample.
Overall, the least-squares dummy-variable model 
yields highly significant results which are consistent with 
the chance-constrained portfolio model. The significance of 
the yield level variable was enhanced by the use of company 
dummies. The magnitude of the between firm variation implies 
that unexplained firm-related phenomena are of great impor­
tance, however the amount of surplus and the yield level re­
main highly significant factors in explaining portfolio 
structure. The next section expands the results of the bas­
ic OLS and LSDV models and a subsequent section deals with 
the positive serial correlation observed in these models.
Extensions of the Basic Models
Despite their inherent limitations, it is possible 
to extend the basic models to consider the effect of relative 
yields and of company size on portfolio choices and to com­
pare the U. S. and Canadian companies.
8Ibid., 343.
116
The effects of relative yields.
In the chance-constrained model, the analytical role 
of relative yields on different securities is complex, which 
makes the empirical significance of yields particularly in­
teresting. For two securities that are substitutes in the 
model, if the yield on one security increases relative to the 
other, ceteris paribus, management should invest more in the 
security with the increased relative yield (and less in the 
other). Also, as established in the previous chapter, the 
demand for a security can be related inversely to its own 
yield. The function of relative yields may be found by sub- 
. . YM YPstitutmg the yield ratios or into the OLS model in 
place of the yield level variable YC. The dependent variables 
considered here in Table 4-10 are the relative amounts of 
bonds, mortgages, and preferred stock: common stock is not
used as a dependent variable because no satisfactory ex ante 
measure of the expected yield on common 9 stock exists.
A comparison of the equations , B M  PS .f°r TA' TA' and TA ln
Tables 4-10 and 4-4 (which used the yield level) shows that 
the coefficients and the t-values of the relative amount of 
surplus, the stock dummy, the New York license dummy, and 
the New York charter dummy are quite similar. Consequently,
9Appendix IV-5 contains equations similar to Table 
4-10 using yield differences instead of yield ratios. The 
two forms of the relative yield variables appear interchange­
able. The next major section of this chapter includes a mod­
el using yield ratios in the LSDV model with similar results.
TABLE 4-10

























































































Std. Error .0782 .0851 .9782 .0850 .0159 .0159
R2 .1859 .1561 .1908 .1569 .2784 .2791
R2 .1830 .1531 .1872 .1532 .2758 .2760
F-Ratio 62.76 50.84 53.94 42.59 106.01 88160
Degrees of 
Freedom (5,1374) (5,1374) (6,1373) (6,1373) (5,1374) (6,1373)
■ ' ■' ■ ■
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the comments made for Table 4-4 about these independent vari­
ables apply equally well to these equations using relative 
yields instead of a proxy yield level and only the yield var­
iables merit discussion.
B PSIn Table 4-10, the equations for and have 
slightly lower standard errors of the estimate and slightly 
higher coefficients of determination than the corresponding 
equations in Table 4-4 and the reverse is true" of the equa- 
Mtions for Tj^. The use of relative yields instead of a proxy 
for the yield level of all financial assets did not signifi­
cantly improve the explanatory power of the regression equa­
tions. For securities which are substitutable, portfolio 
shifts toward those securities with relatively higher yields 
should occur. No such consistent pattern emerged in the sta­
tistical analysis.
. B MIn the first two equations of Table 4-10, and
both appear positively related to the ratio of the mortgage 
yield to the corporate bond yield. If bonds and mortgages 
are close substitutes, opposite signs would be expected,
YM probably (though not necessarily) a negative sign for in
B Mthe equation and a positive sign in the equation. The
YMsame sign implies that a decrease m would result in life 
companies purchasing more of other kinds of assets. Adding 
YP Bto the equation implies that if the yield on corporate 
bonds goes down relative to mortgages and preferred stock, 
life companies buy more bonds. According to the equations
PS for an increase in the yield on preferred stock relative
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to corporate bonds would induce life companies to buy less 
preferred stock. These results are not consistent with the 
predicted signs for mortgages and preferred stock.
These poor results of relative yields may be caused 
by basic statistical and economic problems. As seen in Table 
4-11, the yield variables are highly intercorrelated.
TABLE 4-11








YP .9 86 .980 1.000
YM
YC -.962 -.915 -.932 1.000
YP
YC -. 848 -.819 -.752 .887 1.000
With such highly correlated independent variables and only 15 • 
annual observations per company, multicollinearity is a prob­
lem when more than one yield variable is used in an equation. 
In addition, there are secular trends in yield levels, differ­
entials, and ratios as well as in the dependent variables. 
The ordinary least squares model used above might find a 
spurious relationship which is statistically significant be­
cause of the small number of annual observations.
An alternative explanation of the poor performance 
of relative yields may be that capital markets price securi­
ties quite rationally, given their maturity, liquidity, and
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risk of default, such that a change in relative yields may re­
flect these factors and not imply that one security is rela­
tively more desirable, all things considered. In any case, 
relative yields prove troublesome here and they are reconsid­
ered in subsequent models.
The effect of company size
The previous results indicate that most of the be­
tween company variation remains unexplained. While no expli­
cit hypotheses about company size were derived from the chance- 
constrained model of Chapter III, the size of firms could be a 
source of cross-sectional variation. Increasing returns to 
scale may occur when increased size helps overcome indivisi­
bilities and permits increased specialization of resources 
and personnel. If there are fixed costs associated with each 
market in which life companies purchase securities, a small 
company may forego some types of securities to keep its oper­
ating fixed costs low. For example, a small company may not 
be able to afford both mortgage and bond specialists on its 
staff. Larger companies are able to hire more specialized 
talent and effectively cover all investment areas. Other 
cost differences based on company size exist. Large compan­
ies may have lower brokerage costs because they make larger 
transactions. Large companies may use their own departments 
and rely less heavily on mortgage brokers and mortgage banks 
and large companies may have advantages over smaller ones 
when competing for privately placed securities. A smaller
121 company has a tradeoff between operating costs and the risk
reduction accompanying greater diversification and, faced 
with this choice, a small company may choose to invest in a 
narrower range of capital market instruments.
In Table 4-12, the log of total assets is used as 
an independent variable to estimate the impact of company size
10 Ron portfolio choices. The other variables (^Az YC, SD, IIL, 
and NC) are identical to the regressions reported in Table 4-4. 
While the additional size variable does reduce the standard 
errors of the estimate slightly, it is apparent that the sub­
stantial inter-company variation noted previously still re­
mains. The coefficients and their t-values are basically the 
same in Table 4-4 and Table 4-12 except that in the latter 
the absolute sizes of the NL coefficients are reduced and the 
MNC coefficient in the equation becomes more significant 
when In(TA) is included as an independent variable. Since 
companies licensed or chartered in New York tend to be the 
larger companies, the coefficients of NL and NC were affected 
slightly.
Since the other coefficients have been discussed in 
a previous section, In(TA) is the only variable requiring 
analysis here. If the fraction of total assets invested in 
a security is positively related to the size of the company.
Other size variables used were the ordinal rank of 
a company's size, total assets in millions of dollars, and 
the reciprocal of total assets. The log of total assets used 
here resulted in the lowest standard errors,but the results 
of all size variables were quite similar.
TABLE 4-12
















CONSTANT .418746 .594372 1.013118 -.066406 -.029013 -.093536
R -.233967 -.547038 -.781005 .503848 .174259 .677817
TA (-5.42) (-11.85) (-22.73) (33.14) (20102) (38.73)
SD .005507 .028461 .033968 -.011178 -.001470 -.013153
(1.02) (4.91) (7.88) (-5.86) (-1.35) (-5.99)
YC -.014018 -.004998 -.019105 .002339 .001647 .003963
(-9.00) (-3.00) (-15.34) (4.27) (5.25) (6.28)
NL .040556 -.043046 -.002590 .006688 .003547 .009650
(7.72) (-7.69) (-.62) (3.62) (3.35) (4.53)
NC -.000538 .024803 .024265 .018785 -.000675 -.019479
(-.07) (3.00) (3.94) (-6.89) (-.43) (-6.20)
In (TA .010458 .015935 -.005478 .005268 .—2608 .008093
(5.26) (-7.50) (-3.46) (8.04) (6.51) (10.04)
Std. Error .0780 .0831 .0619 .0274 .0157 .0315
F-Ratio 55.83 55.16 145.79 238.43 96.78 328.72
R2 .1926 .1907 . 3865 .5081 .2942 .5878
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that security can be labeled a superior asset; if the same 
relationship is negative, the security can be labeled an in­
ferior asset. Using these definitions, the coefficients of 
In(TA) imply that bonds, common stock, preferred stock, and, 
of course, common and preferred stock combined are superior 
assets, and that mortgages and bonds and mortgages combined 
are inferior assets. The heavier investment in equities and 
loxver investment in fixed income securities by large compan­
ies may result because large companies have the opportunity 
to diversify more extensively and invest slightly more in 
riskier types of securities and still maintain the same pro­
bability of solvency as a smaller firm. Since the primary 
and secondary markets for martgages are not as well developed 
B M as for bonds, the coefficients of In(TA) in the and 
equations are interesting. Since the overhead and variable 
expenses of a mortgage department are large, it is a natural 
presumption that large companies might enjoy significant eco­
nomies of scale in this type of investment and invest more 
in mortgages than smaller companies. The opposite occurred 
here. It is possible that the companies in this study xvere 
of sufficient size that they are generally able to invest 
efficiently in mortgages, given the institutional character­
istics of that market. The inferiority of mortgages can re­
sult from spatial preferences for mortgages; increasing dis­
tances may entail more expense and risk. In addition, if the 
supply of mortgages to a life company is more yield-elastic 
them the supply of bonds, some life insurance companies may
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have better yields available to them in mortgages due to their 
location, bond yields being more homogeneous nationwide. Geo­
graphy must explain some of the preferences for bonds and 
mortgages.
Since the sizes of the insurance companies were in­
creasing over the period of this study, it is necessary to 
establish whether the conclusions about the significance of 
company size were dependent on time. In Table*4-13, company 
dummies are used to moderate for the effects of cross-sec­
tional variation and year dummies are used to account for 
possible time-related variation. Yields are not used as a 
variable since they are assumed homogeneous at a point in 
p time. Since covaries with time and firm, its significance 
may also be ascribed to cross-sectional or time-related var- 
R iation. In Table 4-13, the coefficients and t-values for ^rA 
and In(TA) are very similar for the simple least squares 
equations and the equations with year dummies, so the results 
obtained previously are obviously not due to a spurious time 
trend. When company dummies are used, most of the coefficients 
are markedly different, reflecting the time-series trends. 
It is obvious from Table 4-13 that the coefficients estimated 
using the pooled data are basically due to cross-sectional
B M Fvariation, since m the regressions for = , =7 , and =-a, the JL A X
coefficients found using company dummies were significantly 
different from the regressions with year dummies and a con­
stant with no dummies. Hypotheses about the comparative be­
havior of life companies due to different surplus levels
TABLE 4-13


































































































































































































































and sizes were tested adequately with the pooled data: time- 
related trends did not bias the acceptance of these hypotheses.
In this section, it appears that fixed income securi­
ties are an inferior good, equities are a superior good, and, 
interestingly, that bonds proved superior to mortgages. Yield 
variables, which are not analyzed with cross-sectional data, 
are examined in more depth in subsequent parts of this chapter.
Comparison of U.S, and Canadian companies
The 12 Canadian companies in the sample did invest 
in a statistically significant different manner than their 
92 U. S. counterparts, as is shown by the Canadian dummy 
(CD = 1 if Canadian, CD = 0 if U. S.) of Table 4-14. The per­
centage of total assets invested in bonds was 0.8 percent more 
for Canadian firms, 2.7 percent less for mortgages, 2.3 per­
cent more for common stock, and 0.3 percent more for preferred 
stock, given the other independent variables. The differences 
for mortgages, common stock, and preferred stock are signifi- ' 
cant at the .01 level.
Further statistical evidence of the differences is 
obtained by estimating separate equations for U. S. firms, 
Canadian firms, and both sets combined and performing a 
Chow test on the hypothesis that the structures of the equa­
tions are homogeneous.^^ Using the structure of the basic
■^Gregory C. Chow, ’’Tests of Equality Between Sets 
of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions," Econometrica, 
XXVIII (July, 1960), 591-605.

















CONSTANT .486931 .501647 .988577 -.038833 -.013135 -.050469
R -.192.75 -.585276 -.777451 .503637 .173711 .674523TA (-4.51) (-12.56) (-24.09) (34.29) (20.55) (39.59)
YC -.014412 -.005969 -.020381 .003605 .001732 .005233
(-9.92) (-3.76) (-18.52) (7.20) (6.01) (9.01)
SD -.088652 .043219 .034567 -.013503 -.002917 -.016426
(-1.72) (7.87) (9.09) (-7.81) (-2.93) (-8.19)
NL .045.98 -.054643 -.009445 .010965 .005312 .015582
(9.39) (-10.39) (-2.59) (6.61) (5.57) (8.10)
NC .006094 .015988 .022082 -.015283 .000927 -.014401
(.79) (1.89) (3.76) (-5.72) (.60) (-4.65)
CD .008271 -.026567 -.018296 .023345 .003494 .027334
(1.25) (-3.67) (-3.65) (10.23) (2.66) (10.32)
Std. Error
of Estimate .0790 .0864 .0598 .0272' .0157 .0316
R2 .1771 .1605 .3946 .4808 .2593 .5510
R2 . 1739 .1572 .3923 . 4788 .2564 .5493
F-Ratio 55.69 49.48 168.72 239.68 90.59 317.68
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OLS equation in Table 4-4, the F tests that the two sets are 





















significantly different using the 
t-tests of the Canadian dummy or the Chow test, in absolute 
terms the Canadian companies are remarkably similar, with the 
largest absolute difference in an investment category being 
12less than 3 percent. Their larger investment in common
stock is the largest relative difference but, if the strong 
CSupward trend in for U.S. companies continues, the existing 
Canadian levels should be reached by most U.S. companies in 
a few years.
12The results of estimating differential slopes and 
intercepts for Canadian companies are given in Appendix IV-6. 
In these equations, multicollinearity reduced the signifi­
cance of the results.
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Cross-SectiaiaL'Time-Serlos Results Using 
Adjustments for Mrst-Order* Autocorrelation 
and Interflrm Variance
In this section, an adjustment for first-order auto­
correlation is integrated into the LSDV model to estimate the 
demand for all six dependent variables using surplus and the 
yield level as independent variables and to estimate the de­
mand for bonds and mortgages with surplus and relative yields 
When serial correlation exists, OLS estimates of the coeffi­
cients are unbiased, but the sampling variances of the coeffi 
cients and the standard errors of the estimate are underesti­
mated and, in addition, the OLS technique is relatively inef-
13ficient. Since only 15 annual observations are available 
for each company, the significance of the previous results 
and the relative efficiency of the estimates are important 
considerations. If we assume a relationship of the form
Yt = XtB + ut
which has the first-order autoregressive scheme
ut = Put-1 + vt lpl-1
where p is known a priori, the effect of autocorrelation is 
easily removed as follows:
Yt = XtB + put_1 + vt
Yt-1 = Xt-1B + Ut-1
PYt-l = pXt-lB + pUt-l 
13Johnston, Econometric Methods, pp. 246-49.
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|Yt " pYt-l> = (xt " Pxt-1)B + vt
* *
Yt = xtB + vt
Hildreth and Lu give a useful iterative technique for deter­
mining p in which the criterion for the selection of p is to 
iterate p over the interval (-1,1) to find that p which min- 
14imizes the sum of squares of error. With the number of de­
grees of freedom fixed, the minimum sum of squares of error 
corresponds to the minimum standard error of the estimate.
A direct estimate of p (such as p = 1 - is not possible 
from the Durbin-Watson statistic since pooled data is utilized.
This first-order autoregressive scheme is combined
with the LSDV model in the following equation:
* * *
Yij = ai + BlXlij + B2X2ij + vij
Briefly, Y* = Y - pYt-1 *= company dummy, = X^t -
pXl(t-l)
*
X2 = X2t  pX2(t-l) and B2 are the coefficients
of the adjusted independent variables and v.. is the error13
term. Y is the proportion of assets invested in a particular 
asset, is the relative amount of surplus, and is the 
yield level proxy. No adjustment is made to the dummies since
14Clifford Hildreth and John Y. Lu, "Demand Relations 
with Autocorrelated Disturbances," Michigan State University 
Technical Bulletin 276, (November, 1960), 1-76.
15A.S. Goldberger, Econometric Theory (New York: John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1964), p. 244.
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they are constant over the time period and would become zero 
when p = 1.0
In Tables 4-15-a through 4-15-f, several iterations 
of p are presented for each of the six dependent variables. 
In the first column of each table where p = 0.0, the struc­
ture of the equations is the same as the basic LSDV model in 
Table 4-7, except the 1957 observation is omitted in order 
to obtain a lagged year's value for each company; this leaves 
14 observations for each company and NT = (92)(14) = 1288 ob­
servations. The equations with 14 and 15 observations per 
firm are virtually identical. In the final column of each 
table where p = 1.0, the variables are simply first differ­
ences (except for the dummies, which are not transformed).
As p is increased, in all cases the coefficients
and their t-values exhibit clear trends so that the results 
of using more precise p's can be easily guessed through in­
terpolation. For each dependent variable, the unreported 
company dummies became less significant as p was increased 
and the coefficients of determination generally declined.
The minimum standard errors occurred at approximately p = .90 
for bonds, p = .87 for mortgages, p = .73 for common stock.
and p = .93 for preferred stock.* 
In the equations for*
the coefficients of and their corresponding t-values in-
*crease as p increased. The coefficients of YC have lower 
- , and in Table 4-15,
significance as p is increased, but remain significant at 
the .01 level. In the equity equations, the coefficients of
TABLE 4-15-a
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPANY DUMMIES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
Dependent B Bvariables is -(r ^A)
lagged
Independent variables r-0.0 r-0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
























Standard Error of the
Estimate .0380 .0222 .0178 .0165 .0160 .0165
R2 .8131 .7508 .6166 . 4506 .2179 .1656
R2 .79 85 .7314 .5868 .4078 .1570 .1006
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 55.84 38.69 20.65 10.53 3.58 2.55
LU
TABLE 4-15-b
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPAI^Y DUMMIES,... COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
Dependent Variable is - (r m.)A lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
























Standard Error of the 
Estimate .0353 .0214 .0179 .0170 .0167 .0172
R2 . 8624 .8090 .6899 .5376 .2958 .1739
R2 .8516 .7941 .6657 .5016 .2409 .1096
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 80.44 54.37 28.56 14.93 5.39 2.70
TABLE 4-15-C
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPANY DUM4IES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
Dependent variable is — - r(— )TA
lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0













YC - rYC , ,lagged -.0198 -.0185 -.0161 -.0139 -.0106 -.00687(-33.15) (-27.27) (-20.63) (-16.09) (-11.16) (-6.81)
Standard Error of the 
Estimate .0297 .0197 .0172 .0164 .0159 .0158
R2 . 8705 . 8007 .6766 .5436 .3534 .2283
R2 . 8604 .7852 .6514 .5081 .3031 .1682
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 86.32 51.60 26.86 15.29 7.02 3.80
U1
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIED REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER
TABLE 15-d
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPANY DUMMIES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
Dependent Variable • cs _ £§. is TA r TA
lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
R R
























Standard Error of the 
Estimate .0130 .0101 .0098 .0099 .0102 .0105
R2 . 8997 .8060 .6679 .5588 .4511 . 4025
R2 .8919 . 7909 .6420 .5244 .4083 . 3560
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 115.13 53.34 25.82 16.26 10.55 8.65
TABLE 4-15-e
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION 2XND COMPANY DUMMIES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUI4I4IES ARE NOT REPORTED
PS PSDependent Variable is mr ” r(Ta) JL * A lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r=0.5 r=0.7 CO oII r=0.9 r=1.0






















Standard Error of the 
Estimate .0099 .0061 .0051 .0047 .0045 .0046
R2 .7473 .6872 .5802 .4707 .3117 .1589
R2 .7277 .6629 .5476 .4294 .2581 .0933
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 37.97 28.21 17.75 11.42 5.81 2.42
TABLE 4-15-f
CROSS-SECTIOMAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTI4ENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPANY DUMMIES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
TS TSDependent Variable is - r(^)
lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
























Standard Error of the 
Estimate .0179 .0123 .0112 .0110 .0111 .0114
R2 .8805 .8125 .6987 .5943 . 4729 .4036
R2 .8711 .7979 .6752 .5627 .4318 . 3572
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 94.56 55.63 29.77 18.81 11.52 8.69
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R* CS* TS*remain highly significant for and , but the signifi-
PS* cance is lowered for . The coefficients of YC* change 
from significantly positive to insignificantly negative as p 
is increased.
To summarize, the above model is used to adjust for 
two basic problems in pooling the cross-sectional/time-series 
data: the problem of serial correlation and the problem of 
non-homogeneous firm intercepts in the cross sections. With 
this model, the standard errors and coefficients of determin­
ation improved substantially. The model continues to high­
light the significant role of surplus in determining asset 
structure: the relative amount of surplus remains negatively 
related to the relative amount of bonds and mortgages the 
life insurance company buys and positively related to the 
proportion of equities owned. The yield level proxy is sig­
nificantly negatively related to the amount of bonds and mort­
gages owned, but this variable has less significance in the 
equity equations.
In Table 4-16, the LSDV model with adjustments for 
first-order autocorrelation is also used to estimate equa­
tions for bonds and mortgages similar to the first two of
YM Table 4-15, except the yield ratio is used instead of the 
yield level. In the basic OLS model using relative yields 
B M in Table 4-10, it was found that both and — were posi- ' TA TA
YM tively related to an unsatisfactory result if bonds and 
mortgages are assumed to be substitutes.
TABLE 4-16-a
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPANY DUMMIES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
B BDependent Variable is - r(— )iA 1A lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
£ - r(R )TA kTA' . ,lagged
-.06067 -.1381 -.1580 -.1582 -.1529 -.1465
(-1.10) (-2.74) (-3.46) (-3.67) (-3.72) (-3.64)
YM ,YMXYC “ r'YC;lagged .1429 .07666 .03958 .01804 -.005589 -.03104(17.19) (11.99) (6.81) (3.15) (-.95) (-4.87)
Standard Error of the 
Estimate .0373 .0224 .0181 .0167 .0162 .0164
R2 . 8201 . 7468 .6024 .4306 .2013 .1714
R2 . 8061 .7271 .5714 .3862 .1391 .1069
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 58.52 37.87 19.45 9.71 3.24 2.66
o
TABLE 4-16-b
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER 
AUTOCORRELATION AND COMPNAY DUMMIES. COEFFICIENTS OF THE COMPANY DUMMIES ARE NOT REPORTED
M MDependent Variable is - r(^A)
lagged
Independent Variables r=0.0 r-0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0














YC r YC' lagged
.07213 .08061 .08810 .09323 .09906 .1052
(9.01) (13.36) (16.21) (17.47) (18.07) (17.70)
Standard Error of 
Estimate .0359 .0211 .0169 .0156 .0150 .0153
R2 .8576 .8146 .7234 .6100 .4321 .3421
R2 . 8465 .8001 .7019 .5796 . 3879 .2909
F-Ratio (93,1194 d.f.) 77.34 56.40 33.58 20.08 9.77 6.68
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The summary statistics of the equations of Table 
4-16 follow the same patterns as those of the same statisti­
cal model above: higher coefficients of determination and 
smaller standard errors. For high p's, the mortgage equa­
tions in Table 4-16-b have much higher coefficients of de­
termination than they did in Table 4-15-b using yield levels. 
Surplus remains negatively related to bond and mortgage hold­
ings, and, as the adjustment factor p is incre’ased, the co­
efficients of surplus become more highly significant.
YM*As- p is increased, the coefficients of increase 
in size and significance for mortgages. Interestingly, the 
YM* coefficients of decrease in size and become negative as 
p is increased in the bond equation. An increase in the 
yield on mortgages relative to bonds appears to result in 
greater investments in mortgages. The effect of this same 
increase on bonds in Table 4-16-a would be to decrease bond­
holdings if the appropriate equation had a p slightly great­
er than 0.9. Where the OLS model exhibited positive coef­
ficients for both bonds and mortgages, the LSDV model yield­
ed the desired positive coefficient for mortgages and no sig­
nificant relationship for bonds. The demand for bonds as a 
YMfunction of appears to be sensitive to changes in the ad­
justment factor p.
To summarize the results of the LSDV model with ad­
justments for autocorrelation, the overall equations were im­
proved and the hypotheses derived from the chance-constrained 
model were substantiated with two qualifications: (1) the
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yield level was found to be a less significant variable in 
explaining the demand for equities than in the simpler regres­
sion model of the previous section, and (2) the yield ratio 
ym — had an ambiguous impact on the demand for bonds. These 
results may be due to the small number of time periods or to 
dynamics of the investment process in life insurance compan­
ies for which the model may be inappropriate.
Cross-Sectional/Time-Series Regressions 
Using Distributed Lag Models
This section estimates the demand for various types 
of securities using the Koyck and the Almon distributed lag 
models, both of which provide insight into the dynamics of 
the portfolio adjustment process. The Koyck model assumes a 
common lag structure for all independent variables and shows 
the speed of adjustment to exogenous changes. Since serial 
correlation can bias the results of the Koyck model, the es­
timating equation used here removes the effects of first- 
order autocorrelation. The Almon technique allows more gen­
eral distributed lag structures and a different structure for 
each independent variable, thus permitting dynamic compari­
sons of the impacts of the exogenous variables.
Koyck distributed lag model
This model is frequently used when the effect of the 
independent variable declines exponentially with time or when 
a simple stock-adjustment process exists. A company's cur­
rent portfolio mixture is the result of current and past 
portfolio decisions. The capacity to change the portfolio 
is based on the gross operating and investment cash inflow 
to the firm and potential liquidation of marketable secur­
ities. The rate of utilization of this capacity to change 
the portfolio is affected by the nature of the investment 
process described in Chapter II.
An assumption that the dependent variable is deter­
mined by the current and all previous values of the inde­
pendent variables where the impact of the independent vari­
ables decays exponentially through time leads to the Koyck 
16 model. The coefficients of the independent variables are 
assumed to decline geometrically as the lag increases:
Bk = BXk K = 0, 1, ...
where 0<X<l and k is the lag in time periods. The distri­
buted lag model is 
9Y. = BX. + XBX. . + X*BX. n +•••+ E. u u u" X L* 2.
The difference between the above equation and the result of 
lagging the equation one period and multiplying it by the 
scalar X yields the estimating equation.
2XY. n = XBX. 3 + X BX.  +•..+ XE. . t—1 t"2 u”1
Yfc = BXt + XY^j^ + E* 
where
Johnston, Econometric Methods, pp. 29 8-30 3, and 
Goldberger, Econometric Theory, pp. 274-78.
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A second explanation for the Koyck model is the 
stock-adjustment model in which a fixed proportion of a dis­
equilibrium is satisfied in a given period.Let equal 
the desired and Y be the actual portfolio proportions. Then
Yt - Yt-1 = 1Y = 6<Yt - Yt-1> + Et
yd = a + bX
This is easily estimated as
Y = 6a + 6bX + (1-6) Yt_1 + Et
The stock adjustment coefficient 6 is the complement of the 
coefficient estimated for the lagged dependent variable.
One complication which must be dealt with here is 
the presence of serial correlation, which in a Koyck model 
leads to biased and inconsistent results. Griliches points 
out that simple autocorrelation can be confused with the 
18Koyck model. Consider the following model:
Y. = aX, + u. t t t 
where
ut = put-l + et
If we mistakenly estimate a Koyck model using OLS
Yt = axt + bYt_1 4- vt 
the coefficient of will approximately equal p because 
the model has been misspecified. The correct specification
17 Goldberger, Econometric Theory, pp. 274-5.
18Zvi Griliches, "Distributed Lags: A Survey,"
Econometrica, XXXV (January, 1967), 33-4.
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would be
Yt = axt + + et
Obviously, if this equation is estimated and the coefficient 
of equals minus the product of the coefficients of Xt 
and Yt_j# the serial correlation model would appear to be 
the correct model and not the Koyck model.
The results of estimating this equation with com­
pany intercepts for the six dependent variables are given in 
Table 4-17. The products of the coefficients of current in­
dependent variable and the lagged dependent variable are in 
the neighborhood of the coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variables. The estimates for p range from .664 to .915. 
Since the autocorrelation biases the coefficients of the 
lagged dependent variable, the Koyck model cannot be esti­
mated using OLS.
It is possible to estimate the Koyck distributed lag 
19 model with first-order autocorrelation with this equation:
Yt = aXt - apXt_1 + (p+b) - bpYt_1 + et
or
Yt - »Yt-l = a|Xt - + b(Yt-l - pYt-2> + et
This equation is estimated by iterating over p in 
Table 4-18 in which company dummies are included. Surplus 
and the yield level remain negatively related to the demand 
for bonds, mortgages, and fixed assets, and surplus is
199Ibid., 40.
TABLE 4-17
















R -.212257 -.386225 -.600959 .674981 .031146 .721355
TA (-5.08) (-9.77) (-15.53) (27.24) (2.65) (25.72)
YC -.005738 -.000213 -.006331 -.000309 -.000638 -.000784
(-5.48) (-.22) (-6.64) (-.50) (-2.20) (-1.13)
Dep. Var. , .905875 .876152 .888746 .664313 .915005 .805422"* J. (74.51) (70.54) (58. 84) (31.36) (67.95) (45.57)
(§A) .180829 .405544 .590310 -.538798 -.001170 -.611497TA_1 (4.29) (10.10) (14.89) (-19.36) (-10) (-19.86)
YC-1 .006282 -.005933 .000580 .002459 .000887 .003028(5.60) (-5.49) (.55) (3.69) (2.81) (4.01)
Std. Error
of Estimate .0160 .0151 .0147 .0094 .0045 .0107
R2 .9672 .9750 .9683 .9473 , .9488 .9572
R2 .9646 .9730 .9657 .0430 .9447 .9538
F-Ratio 365.80 484.81 378.43 222.95 229.97 277.67
TABLE 4-18-a
KOYCK MODEL USING COMPANY DUMI4IES AND AUTOCORRELATION ADJUSTMENT
B BDependent Variable is
Independent Variables • r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
R fR .TA ■" rlTA,_1 -.138546 -.195553 -.216892 -.230503 -.246411(-3.78) (-4.48) (-5.31) (-5.65) (-6.04)










,B » »B <r(TA^_2 .675598 .433621 .295275 .92374 .168592
(31.36) (16.58) (10.61) (6.48) (5.71)
Standard Error of 
Estimate .0155 .0154 .0153 .0153 .0160
R2 . 8739 .70 32 .5148 .2630 .1977
R2 . 8631 .6778 .4733 .2001 .1292
F-Ratio 81.17 27.75 12.43 4.18 2.89
TABLE 4-18-b
KOYCK MODEL USING COMPANY DUMMIES AND AUTOCORRELATION ADJUSTMENT
M Dependent Variable is - ZM \ r(TA)_1
Independent Variables r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r-1.0
R ,R .TA ~ r^TA,_1 -.298803 -.416930
.445310 -.442306 -.415889
(-8.27) (-10.26) (-10.64) (-10.45) (-9.90)
YC - rYC , -.006570 -.007266 .006947 -.005425 -.002618-1 (-11.72) (-9.75) (-8.07) (-5.55) (-2.46)
,M . ,M .(TA)_1 r TA _2 .698362 .513026 .414406 .343283 .315695(30.69) (18.61) (14.18) (11.48) (10.65)
Standard Error of 
Estimate .0153 .0154 .0156 .0158 .0163
R2 .9028 .7718 .6172 .3766 .2479
R2 . 8945 .7523 .5846 . 3234 .1837
F-Ratio 108.78 39.62 18.89 7.08 3.86
TABLE 4-18-C
KOYCK MODEL USING COI4PANY DUMMIES AND AUTOCORRELATION ADJUSTMENT
Dependent Variable . F15 TA "
Fr(TA>_1
Independent Variables r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
TA ~ r^TA -.601070 .644194 -.646566 -.621733(-14.78) (-15.63) (-15. 86 (-15.79)
YC - rYC_1 -.011618 .011329 -.009524 -.006595
(-14.69) (-13.10) (-10.13) (-6.65)
F F^TA^^ r(TA^_2 .379938 .276517 .174948 .086849(14.61) (10.38) (6.48) (3.22)
Standard Error of 
Estimate .0155 .0153 .0152 .0153
R2 .7307 .5853 . 3823 .2635
R2 .7077 .5499 .3296 .2006
F-Ratio 31.77 16.53 7.25 4.19
TABLE 4-18-d
KOYCK MODEL USING COMPANY DUMMIES AND AUTOCORRELATION ADJUSTMENT
Dependent Variable . CS15 TA r(^) kTA7_1
Independent Variables r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0
R (5. \TA “ rlTA;_1
.606578 .678788 .694353 .697298 .694080
(25.55) (27.02) (27.04) (26.88) (26.90)
YC - rYC , .002626 .002302 .001682 .000700 -.000386-1 (7.31) (5.04) (3.20) (1.17) (-.59_
,CSX _,CS.TA ~ r TA _2 .039936 -.086439
.126234 -.150889 -.160360
(1.65) (-3.72) (-5.53) (-6.72) (-7.26)
Standard Error of 
Estimate .0099 .0096 .0096 .0097 .0101
R2 .8116 .6767 .5761 .4839 .4537
R2 .7955 .6491 .5399 .4399 .4070
F-Ratio 50.46 24.52 15.92 10.9 8 9.73
TABLE 4-18-e
KOYCK MODEL USING COMPANY DUMMIES AND AUTOCORRELATION ADJUSTMENT
Dependent Variable is Es _1S TA r(^)'TA; _1
Independent Variables r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0






























Standard Error of 
Estimate .0043 .0044 .0044 .0044 .0045
R2 .8510 .7057 .5723 .3903 .2194
R2 . 8383 .6805 .5358 .3383 .1528
F-Ratio 66.90 28.08 15.67 7.50 3.29
H vn ro
TABLE 4-18-f
KOYCK MODEL USING COMPANY DUMMIES AND AUTOCORRELATION ADJUSTMENT
TS TSDependent Variable is - r(^)
Independent Variables r=0.5 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 r=1.0






























Standard Error of 
Estimate .0115 .0109 .0107 .0107 .0110
R2 .8377 .7154 .6146 .5051 .4507
R2 . 8239 .6911 .5817 . 4628 . 4038
F-Ratio 60.47 29.44 18.68 11.95 9.61
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positively related to the demand for common, preferred, and 
total stock. However, the estimated coefficients for YC in 
the equity equations and for the lagged dependent variable 
in all equations appear to be very sensitive to the value of 
p used. The Hildreth-Lu minimum standard error criterion 
for selecting p is difficult to apply in this case with con­
fidence because the standard errors change relatively little 
as p is iterated. Consequently, estimates for p found in 
Table 4-15 of the previous section are applied here. These 
are .90 for ^A, .87 for ^A, .93 for ^A, .73 for .93 for 
PS TS^A, and .83 for With these estimates for p, it appears 
in Table 4-18 that the yield level is positively related to 
the demand for common stock and total equities and negatively 
related to the demand for preferred stock.
The coefficients of the lagged dependent variables 
indicate the persistence of the exponentially declining im­
pact of the independent variables on alternately, the speed 
of adjustment to a disequilibrium. Using the values of p, 















Overall, these values imply that portfolio adjustments occur 
rapidly and that the impact of lagged independent variables
20declines rapidly. More rapid speeds of adjustment for fin­
ancial institutions compared to industrial firms should be 
possible because of the differences between financial assets 
and tangible assets outlined in Chapter I. Life insurance 
companies appear to make decisions based on current (as op­
posed to lagged) exogenous events and to affect the bulk of 
their desired portfolio adjustments within one period.
Almon distributed lag model
The nature of a lag structure in the life insurance 
investment process is affected by the time necessary to per­
ceive changes in the independent variables, by the forward 
commitment procedures for mortgages and bonds, and by the 
presence of illiquid assets which cannot be converted to 
another form at a low cost. The high positive serial corre­
lation of several estimating models in earlier parts of this 
chapter and the results of the Koyck distributed lag model 
argue for the existence of a lag structure which can be
20This is in marked contrast to the biased estimates 
obtained for the Koyck model using OLS given in Appendix IV-7. 
The coefficients for the lagged dependent variables were .91 
f°r .99 for ^A, .95 for ^A, .48 for .91 for and 
.66 for 2^. The economic interpretation of these biased co­
efficients would be quite different from those obtained from 
the Koyck model, correctly specified.
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21 explored further with the Almon lag technique.
Almon Lags have some important advantages over the 
Koyck model presented above. The Almon lag structure can 
assume a general polynomial shape and is not restricted to 
the geometric structure of the Koyck lag. Separate struc­
tures may be estimated for each independent variable. Fin­
ally, as established in the previous section, the presence 
of autocorrelation leads to biased estimates in a Koyck 
model: but serial correlation results in inefficiency, but 
not bias, in the Almon model.
In the Almon lag model, the weights of the current 
and lagged independent variables are assumed to lie on a 
polynomial of degree p:
Y. = w X. + W..X. . + •••+ w X. „ + E. t o t 1 t-1 n t-n t
where
w- = X + X-.i + X-i^ +.. •+ X i^ 10 12 p
i = 0, 1, ... , n; p £ n
This a priori assumption about the weights leads to more ef­
ficient estimates and more powerful tests. In addition, it 
is possible to constrain the coefficients of the independent 
variable for period t - n or period t + 1 to zero. The re­
searcher applying the Almon lag technique must choose the 
length of the lag n and the degree of the polynomial p and
21Shirley Almon, "The Distributed Lag Between Cap­
ital Appropriations and Expenditures," Econometrica, XXXIII 
(January, 1965), 178-96.
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and he must make appropriate assumptions about endpoint con­
straints. Of course, if a specification error is committed, 
the estimates and tests will be invalid.
Tables 4-19 and 4-20 present equations estimated 
using the Almon lag technique with a second degree polynomial, 
n = 4 for yields, n = 3 for surplus, and the coefficients at 
(t-n) are constrained to zero. This specification led to 
generally smaller standard errors than several alternative 
specifications which were tried. Since the data set contains 
15 annual observations for 92 firms, the four year lag re­
duced the annual observations to 11 per company and, in turn, 
the degree of the polynomial is constrained by the lag 
length, p<n. Since the coefficients of the independent var­
iables to which the Almon lag was applied were extremely 
sensitive to the assumed lag structure and since there is no 
a priori correct structure, the specific results of Tables 
4-19 and 4-20 should not be overstated.
The coefficients and significance of the stock dum­
my, the Nev; York license dummy, and the New York charter dum­
my are in accordance with those found in prior models of 
this chapter, even though the estimates of Tables 4-19 and 
4-20 are based on only eleven annual observations per com­
pany. Consequently, it is only necessary to reaffirm that 
the interpretations previously applied to these dummy vari­
ables would be the same for the Almon lag model. In addition, 
the sign and significance of the sum of the coefficients of
TABLE 4-19
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CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES RESULTS USING THE 
ALMON LAG TECHNIQUE WITH YIELD LEVELS
Dependent Variable
Independent B M F_
Variables TA TA TA
CONSTANT .4228 .5811 1.0039
YC(t) -.0151 .0094 -.0057
(-3.97) (2.22) (-1.80)
(t-1) -.0009 -.0065 -.0074
(-.92) (-6.04) (-9.09)
(t-2) .0064 -.0134 -.0070
(2.19) (-4.17) (-2.90)
(t-3) .0067 -.0112 -.0046
(2.54) (-3.86) (-2.08)
(t-4) 0 0 0
— (t) TA1 1 -.3417 -.1167 -.4584(-2.10) (-.65) (-3.37)
(t-1) .0118 -.2688 -.2569
(.20) (-4.17) (-5.28)
(t-2) .1258 -.2299 -.1041
(1.15) (-1.89) (-1.13)
(t-3) 0 0 0
SD .0039 .0389 .0428
(.65) (5.81) (8.46)
NL .0404 -.0554 -.0150
(7.37) (-9.12) (-3.26)
NC .0072 .0212 .0284
(.84) (2.24) (3.97)
SUM YC -.0030 -.0218 -.0248
(-.92) (-6.04) (-9.09)
SUM |A -.2041 -.6154 -.8195
(-4.28) (-11.62) (-20.48)
Standard Error .0740 .0821 .0620
R2 . 1402 .1899 . 3853
Degrees of 
Freedom 1004 1004 1004
TABLE 4-19—Continued 159
Dependent Variable
Independent B M F
Variable TA TA TA
CONSTANT -.0450 -.0159 -.0597
YC(t) -.0002 .0000 -.0002
(-.13) (.05) (-09)
(t-1) .0015 .0005 .0020
(4.08) (2.41) (4.73)
(t-2) .0021 .0007 .0028
(1.92) (1.05) (2.19)
(t-3) .0016 .0005 .0021
(1.61) (.86) (1.83)
(t-4) 0 0 0
— (t) ta^' .5071 .0008 .5059(8.20) (.02) (7.05)
(t-1) .0888 .1002 .1895
(4.02) (7.48) (7.38)
(t-2) -.0802 .0999 .0208
(-1.92) (3.95) (.43)
(t-3) 0 0 0
SD -.0149 -.0017 -.0172
(-6.49) )=1.24) (-6.43)
NL .0133 .0064 .0189
(6.35) (5.03) (7.80) •
NC -.0185 .0001 -.0174
(-5.37) (.07) (-4.62)
SUM YC .0051 .0018 .0068
(4.08) (2.41) (4.73)
SUM .5157 .2009 . 7162
(28.38) (18.25) (33.94)
Standard Error .0282 .0171 .0327
R2 . 5058 .3018 .5900
Degrees of
Freedom 1004 1004 1004
TABLE 4-20
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CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES RESULTS USING THE 





























































Standard Error .0739 .0821
R2 .1434 .1893
Degree of Freedom 1004 1004
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YC, and are generally similar to comparable earlier 
models where these variables appeared only contemporaneously 
with the dependent variables with two exceptions: the yield 
level proxy is less significant than in Table 4-4 except for 
mortgages, and the yield ratio is more significant for mort­
gages in Table 4-20 whereas it was more significant for 
bonds in Table 4-10. The standard errors are now lower for 
bonds and mortgages; otherwise these summary statistics were 
basically identical. Overall, the Almon lag model does not 
alter earlier results of the basic ordinary least squares 
model and it provides additional information about the dy­
namic impacts of yields and surplus on portfolio choices of 
life insurance companies.
F CS As best seen in the equations for and in 
Table 4-20, the impact of changes in surplus appears to be 
fairly rapid, mostly occurring in the current year. The 
role of changes in the yield level is relatively slow, with 
the current yield level usually less significant than the 
lagged values. Surplus and the yield level affect faster 
PS than mortgages. The yield level has a weak influence on 
PS and surplus affects only when lagged.
YM .In Table 4-20 where the yield ratio is substi-
YM tuted for the yield level, the coefficient of should be
M Bpositive for and negative for if bonds and mortgages 
are substitutes. This coefficient is significantly negative
M for = for periods t-1 t-2, and t-3 and the coefficient has
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the wrong sign at the .01 significance level for mortgages 
in period t and for bonds at t and t-1. The coefficient has 
the desired negative sign for bonds in periods t-2 and t-3, 
but not at the .01 significance level. These results would 
be consistent with a hypothesis (a) that there are signifi­
cant lags of at least a year in the investment response of 
mortgages and (b) that bonds are a residual category of as­
sets which absorb investible funds when the life insurance 
company has nothing better to do with them. However, the 
empirical results are neither clear enough to support this 
hypothesis nor to reject the assumption that bonds and mort­
gages are good substitutes.
Briefly, both distributed lag models employed here 
show that portfolio adjustments take place mostly within a 
year, with the mortgage and preferred stock adjustments be­
ing the slowest. Adjustments to changes in equity are much 
faster than to changes in yields. The differences in the 
polynomial lag structures for bonds and mortgages may be due 
to the nature of the forward commitment process in the mort­
gage market and to the historical lack of an effective sec­
ondary mortgage market. The significance of coefficients of 
YM Rthe sum of YC and y^-, the sum or and NL, NC, and SD are 
basically identical to the results of the OLS or LSDV models. 
Both the Almon and Koyck models yield results that are con­
sistent with the static chance-constrained model of Chapter 
III and conform to the dynamics expected from the institu­




The empirical results of this chapter are in gener­
al, though not complete, agreement with the hypotheses gen­
erated by the chance-constrained model of life insurance 
portfolio behavior.
pThe relative quantity of surplus, was consis­
tently highly significant and had the correct signs for every 
type of econometric model used. Even with the introduction 
of company dummies, adjustments for serial correlation, and 
the use of distributed lags, surplus remained a highly sig­
nificant determinant of life insurance portfolio choices.
The hypothesis that a high amount of surplus provides a 
safety margin which allows life insurance companies to in­
vest more aggressively in risky types of assets and yet to 
maintain a high probability of solvency is supported by the 
empirical behavior of 92 companies from 1957-71.
The performance of the yield variables was mixed, 
though generally conforming with the stated hypotheses. The 
earnings cushion provided by a high level of financial 
yields did correlate positively to investments in risky types 
of assets and negatively to investments in safer assets. An 
exception to this was the demand for equities in the models 
which removed autocorrelation in which the relationship be-
CS PS TStween YC and and was not significant. Relative
In 1 ex X
yields expressed as yield ratios had the predicted signs for
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mortgages and incorrect signs for preferred stock, and vac­
illated in the bond equations. Classical statistical prob­
lems of autocorrelation, multicollinear!ty, and small sample 
size (15 annual observations) could have caused these re­
sults. However, as will be outlined in the concluding chap­
ter, this study has advanced questions about the theoretical 
and normative meaning of the yield variables, which has im- 
lications for financial econometric research in other areas.
Stock companies possessed the more conservative 
portfolios predicted because of the differences between pol­
icies sold by stock and mutual companies. Differences in in­
vestments of companies subject to and not subject to New 
York regulations were observed. However, since considerable 
slack in restricted investment categories was found for most 
companies. New York portfolio limitations cannot be consid­
ered generally binding.
Differences in portfolio choices based on company 
size were found: equities were found to be superior invest­
ments and, surprisingly, mortgages were found to be inferior 
to bonds. Canadian companies made statistically significant 
different portfolio choices from U.S. firms, but the abso­
lute differences were not great.
Distributed lag models showed that response to 
changes in independent variables occurred very fast, parti­
cularly to changes in surplus. The dynamic results were 
reasonably consistent with the institutional features of the 
different capital markets.
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Overall, the econometric results of this chapter 
sustained the predictions of the chance-constrained port­
folio model. The economic implications of this research are 
discussed in the concluding chapter.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
Based on the institutional and economic environment 
in which life insurance companies operate, this study devel­
oped a theoretical portfolio model with sufficient empirical 
content to yield readily testable hypotheses about life in­
surance portfolio behavior. The results have significant 
implications for financial research and provide considerable 
insight into life insurance investment choices.
State quantitative and qualitative restrictions on 
portfolio composition, the accounting procedures promulgated 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, and 
Federal tax laws can influence the portfolio choices made by 
life insurance companies. Given these, the solvency of a 
life insurance company depends on its investment experience, 
its operating expenses, and the obligations resulting from 
its outstanding policies. The chance-constrained model de­
veloped in this study integrated the basic economic variables 
affecting life insurance portfolio management and suggested 
some economic relationships which were explored with various 
econometric techniques. In their role as one of the largest 
financial intermediaries, life insurance companies have sub­
stantial obligations to millions of households, are major 
suppliers of funds to two major capital markets, the
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corporate bond and mortgage markets, and are lessor sources 
of funds to other markets. Consequently, the life insurance 
industry directly affects the sectors of the economy with 
which it deals and is of interest to those who regulate and 
tax the industry.
Some inferences about the empirical performance of 
large life insurance companies are possible from this study. 
The variation in portfolio choices can be compartmentalized 
as follows: variation explained by the economic character­
istics of a particular firm, variation explained by economic 
or regulatory forces external to the firm, and, finally, var­
iation which is not explained by any variables used here.
Variables endogenous to the firm proved to be high­
ly significant determinants of investment choices. The 
amount of surplus was positively related to investments in 
riskier types of assets, as predicted by the chance-con­
strained model, and stock companies tended to invest more 
conservatively than mutuals, also as predicted. While not 
derived from the chance-constrained model, company size was 
correlated positively with riskier types of investments. 
These results imply a rational economic basis for portfolio 
differences between firms.
Variables exogeneous to the firm proved less signi­
ficant than endogeneous variables. While companies subject 
to New York regulations did possess lower percentages of 
assets invested in equities, ceteris paribus, the vast
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majority of these companies had considerable slack available 
in this investment category. Geographic preferences between 
bonds and mortgages appear to exist apart from regulations. 
However, portfolio choices proved relatively insensitive to 
yield variables.
Capital markets are considered to be allocationally 
efficient if resources flow to those uses promising the high­
est rates of return; the demand for various securities should 
be responsive to yield changes. The yield level was nega­
tively related to the investment in fixed income securities, 
as predicted. Otherwise, the yield level and yield ratios 
failed to give consistent results. The statistical problems 
of multicollinearity, autocorrelation, and limited sample 
size (15 annual observations) were dealt with by limiting 
the hypotheses advanced and through the particular economet­
ric techniques employed. In addition to these statistical 
problems, this study highlights three further difficulties 
which question the normative significance of yield variables. 
These statistical and economic problems could apply to other 
research areas, as well.
First, the assumption that the demand for a secur­
ity should be positively related to its own yield, ceteris 
paribus, was found invalid. In a portfolio model in which 
there is a tradeoff between yield and probability of insol­
vency (or yield and risk), the demand for a security log­
ically can be inversely related to its yield since an in­
creased yield on a low return security increases the risk-
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taking capacity of a life insurance company, enabling it to 
shift towards riskier securities and maintain at least the 
same probability of solvency.
A second problem is that yield changes for a secur­
ity on which a constraint is binding may have no impact on 
the demand for that security. Yield fluctuations below that 
point where the demand is zero have no impact on demand when 
non-negativity constraints apply, and, likewise, once an up­
per bound constraint is binding, further yield increases 
should have a completely inelastic demand response. In the 
portfolio model, high correlations among yields increase the 
likelihood that these upper and lower bound constraints are 
binding.
A third and final problem is that measured yield 
changes may not signify that the desirability of a security 
is changed. Yield differentials may change because the cap­
ital markets have perceived changes in the characteristics 
of a security or typ^'of security. Relative yields are 
based on complex evaluations of risk of default, liquidity, 
transactions costs, callability, tax treatments, maturity, 
and inflationary expectations. A rational investor who 
sees a yield change in response to such economic character­
istics could purchase more, the same, or less of such a 
security when these other characteristics are not quantified 
and his tradeoffs are not known.
The considerable between firm variation accounted 
for by the use of company dummies might be reduced by 
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introducing additional explanatory variables beyond those 
used here. The lack of homogeneity among firms may also be 
caused by a high degree of substitutability among financial 
assets, which makes financial econometric analysis more chal­
lenging. If two securities are perfect substitutes, then 
the relative demands for them may be indeterminate for some 
parameter values. Efficient capital markets should price 
assets to remove strong preferences and to facilitate indif­
ference across securities.
The dynamics of the investment process was explored 
in two distributed lag models. Most of the portfolio adjust­
ment to changes in explanatory variables occurred within one 
year, with bonds and common stock responding the fastest, 
and changes in surplus resulted in portfolio shifts faster 
than changes in yield variables. Higher adjustment rates 
should be expected of financial intermediaries than for non- 
financial businesses.
The life insurance investment process is complex, 
dealing with the economics of the capital markets, portfolio 
theory, and the theory of financial intermediation on the 
one hand and varied state regulations. Federal tax laws, and 
accounting procedures on the other. Superimposed on this 
complex system, the chance-constrained portfolio model hypo­
thesized some patterns of behavior which were verified with 
econometric analysis. These results should interest all 




In Chapter III, the sensitivity of portfolio
choices to the parameters of the chance-constrained model 
mentioned in that chapter.of each of the parameter changes
two-security portfolioFor simplicity, assume a
with a portfolio return and risk as follows:
Let
Security 2 is the riskier, higher return security.
chance-constrained model, as developed in
= l(S-kLR) + 1 
z z
were discussed. This appendix gives a graphical example
1
all < a22
Changes in r , r_, c-.-., a■\^, s' or z change
X. -LX Me X Me
the optimal (R, ) combination and its underlying portfolio
9 2a = + X2O22 + 2X1X2a12




composition (X and X ). With r and r9 constant, a 12 1
higher R can occur only with a shift from security 1
towards security 2, and, with a22 and o^2 constant
(and if the slope of the efficiency frontier is positive), 
a higher portfolio o can occur only by increasing X2 and 
decreasing X^.
All of the parameter changes discussed in Chapter
III which would cause the choice of a higher (R,a) combi­
nation are illustrated in the following graphs and, in 
turn, summarized in Table III.
(2) increase in r2
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APPENDIX III—Continued
(5) decrease in 0^2
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APPENDIX III—Continued
(6) yields increase by a constant





(8) Proportional increase in elements of return 
vector and square roots of elements of variance­
covariance matrix
Ir^ = br
0^2 = ^2 where b > 1
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APPENDIX III—Continued













Shifts in Efficiency 
Frontier
(1) Increase in r^ + + — +
(2) Increase in + + — +
(3) Decrease in + + — +
(4) Decrease in <^22 + + — +
(5) Decrease in + + — +
(6) Yields increase 
by constant + + — +
(7) Proportional de­
crease in square 
roots of elements 
of variance-co­
variance matrix + + +
(8) Proportional in­
crease in elements 
of return vector 
and square roots 
of elements of 
variance­
covariance matrix + + + —
Shifts in Preference 
Function
(9) Increase in 
surplus + + — +
(10) Decrease in k + + — +
(11) Decrease in Z + + — +
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APPENDIX III—Continued
All of these situations were discussed in Chapter 
III. Of course, parameter changes in the opposite direc­
tion of those listed above would cause opposite changes 
in R, a, X^, and The portfolio can be expanded to 
include more than two securities and any of the portfolio 
shifts above is possible in an n-security case as well.
APPENDIX IV-1











1 The Prudential Insurance Co. of America N.J. M yes 31,159.60
2 Metropolitan LIC N.Y. M yes 29,163.29
3 The Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of the U.S. N.Y. M yes 15,395.25
4 New York LIC N.Y. M yes 11,268.29
5 John Hancock Mutual LIC Mass. M yes 10,603.73
6 Aetna LIC Conn. S yes 7,803.60
7 The Northwestern Mutual LIC Wis. M yes 6,453.47
8 Connecticut General LIC Conn. S yes 5,668.82
9 The Travelers Insurance Co. Conn. S yes 5,043.96
10 Massachusetts Mutual LIC Mass. M yes 4,566.07
11 The Mutual LIC of New York N.Y. M yes 3,946.64
12 New England Mutual LIC Mass. M yes 3,751.75
13 Connecticut Mutual LIC Conn. M yes 2,922.38
14 Mutual Benefit LIC N.J. M yes 2,698.00
15 Teachers Ins. and Annuity Assn, of America N.Y. S yes 2,596.92
16 The Penn Mutual LIC Pa. M yes 2,512.20
17 The Lincoln National LIC Ind. S ' no 2,363.64
18 Bankers Life Co. Iowa M yes 2,250.75
19 The Western and Southern LIC Ohio M no 1,979.94
20 The National Life & Accident Insurance Co. Tenn. S no 1,890.47
21 Occidental LIC of California Calif. S no 1,796.04
22 Continental Assurance Co. Ill. s yes 1,769.56 H
23 National LIC Vt. M yes 1,521.94





Name Charter Mutual License (in $ million)
25 Phoenix Mutual LIC Conn. M yes 1,446.62
26 Franklin LIC Ill. S no 1,311.25
27 State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America Mass. M yes 1,305.42
28 Provident Mutual LIC of Philadelphia Pa. M yes 1,190.96
29 Southwestern LIC Tex. S no 1,122.48
30 Jefferson Standard LIC N.C. S no 1,056.13
31 The Guardian LIC of America N.Y. M yes 993.12
32 Pacific Mutual LIC Calif. M no 992.24
33 Equitable LIC of Iowa Iowa S yes 958.06
34 The Union Central LIC Ohio M yes 919.14
35 State Farm LIC Ill. S no 902.20
36 The LIC of Virginia Va. S no 894.79
37 Home LIC N.Y. M yes 884.52
38 Liberty National LIC Ala. S no 864.93
39 United Benefit LIC Nebr. s no 770.03
40 Provident Life and Accident Insurance Co. Tenn. s no 717.98
41 The Minnesota Mutual LIC Minn. M * no 694.80
42 Northwestern National LIC Minn. s no 690.17
43 General American LIC Mo. M no 607.13
44 Acacia Mutual LIC Wash., D.C. M no 596.17
45 The Fidelity Mutual LIC Pa. M yes 595.54
46 Nationwide LIC Ohio S yes 577.04
47 Washington National Insurance Co. Ill. S no 569.38 §












49 Kansas City LIC Mo. S no 555.20
50 Southland LIC Tex. S no 553.11
51 Life and Casualty Insurance Co. of Tenn. Tenn. s no 538.86
52 Commonwealth LIC Ky. s no 506.33
53 Country LIC Ill. s no 489.60
54 LIC of Georgia Gel e s no 480.25
55 Pilot LIC N.C. s no 472.19
56 California-Western States LIC Calif. s no 458.55
57 United Insurance Co. of America Ill. s no 456.49
58 The Paul Revere LIC Mass. s yes 445.77
59 Monumental LIC Md. s no 417.46
60 Gulf LIC Fla. s no 414.62
61 Republic National LIC Tex. s no 411.51
62 American United LIC Ind. M no 405.43
63 Business Men's Assurance Co. of America Mo. s no 396.33
64 Ohio National LIC Ohio M no 394.19
65 Pan-American LIC La. M ' no 394.04
66 Monarch LIC Mass. s yes 373.23
67 Bankers LIC of Nebraska Nebr. M no 370.46
68 Great Southern LIC Tex. S no 363.48
69 Home Beneficial LIC Va. s no 348.40
70 The Manhattan LIC N.Y. M yes 344.32
71 Union Mutual LIC Maine M yes 336.89 §












73 Lutheran Mutual LIC Iowa M yes 314.45
74 Berkshire LIC Mass. M yes 311.04
75 Mutual Trust LIC Ill. M yes 303.08
76 Liberty LIC S.C. S no 302.10
77 The Independent Life and Accident Ins. Co. Fla. S no 290.20
78 The United States LIC in the City of N .Y. N.Y. s yes 283.33
79 Peoples LIC, Washington, D.C. Wash., D.C . s no 279.78
80 Mass. Savings Bk. LI, Commonwealth of Mass. Mass. M no 271.54
81 The Columbus Mutual LIC Ohio s no 270.41
82 Indianapolis LIC Ind. M no 263.34
83 Hartford LIC Mass. S yes 252.86
84 Sun LIC of America Md. S no 227.06
85 Guarantee Mutual Life Co. Nebr. M no 224.35
86 Midland Mutual LIC Ohio M no 206.26
87 Western LIC Minn. o no 201.26
88 Equitable LIC Wash., D.C . S no 200.35
89 Ohio State LIC Ohio S no 200.10
90 Beneficial LIC Utah S no 197.40
91 Continental American LIC Del. S yes 192.23
92 The Colonial LIC of America N.J. s yes 191.48
coro
APPENDIX IV-2
12 CANADIAN COMPANIES IN SAMPLE
12/31/71
Stock/ N.Y. Total Assets
Name Mutual License (in $ million)
1 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada M no 3,874.40
2 The Manufacturers LIC M no 2,192.60
3 London LIC S no 1,734.26
4 The Great-West Life Assurance Co. S no 1,634.46
5 The Canada Life Assurance Co. M yes 1,406.78
6 The Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada M no 1,288.08
7 Confederation Life Association M yes 933.89
8 Crown LIC S no 809.60
9 North American Life Assurance Co. M no 749.36
10 The Imperial Life Assurance Co. of Canada S no 533.42
11 The Dominion Life Assurance Co. S no 378.11
12 The Excelsior LIC s no 278.88
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Aid Association for Lutherans Wis. M yes 937.78 inc. dataa
Lutheran Brotherhood Minn. M. yes 651.29 inc. data
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co. Nebr. M yes 625.09 inc. data
Knights of Columbus Conn. M yes 441.38 inc. data
Woodmen of the World LI Society Nebr. M yes 401.77 inc. data
American General LIC of Delaware Del. S no 314.21 inc. data
Modern Woodmen of America Ill. M yes 299.39 inc. data
Transamerica Ins. Corp, of Calif. Calif. S no 298.79 inc. data
LIC of North America Pa. S no 295.68 1small size'
Southern Farm Bureau LIC Miss. S no 290.98 small size
Allstate LIC Ill. S yes 277.03 small size
Combined Ins. Co. of America Ill. S no 276.18 inc. data
American General LIC Tex. s no 256.77 small size
Royal Neighbors of America Ill. M yes , 224.83 inc. data
Fireman's Fund American LIC Calif. S no 220.14 inc. data
















Fidelity Union LIC Tex. S no 219.25 small size
American-Amicable LIC Ala. S no 198.87 inc. data
Kentucky Central LIC Ky. S no 198.72 small size
Interstate Life & Accident Ins. Co. Tenn. S no 197.33 small size
American Health and LIC Md. S no 195.92 small size
Standard Insurance Co. Oreg. M no 193.42 small size
Philadephia LIC Pa. S no 192.05 small size
The Independent Order of Foresters Canada M yes 342.92 inc. data
The Nat. Life Assurance Co. of Canada Canada S yes 267.50 small size
Industrial LIC Canada S no 251.67 small size
aThe company does not provide complete data back to 1957.
^The company possesses complete information, but its initial size may be 
insufficient for efficient diversification across all capital markets.
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CONSTANT .489802 .492423 .982225 -.030729 -.011922 -.040979
R -.205647 -.542003 -.747650 .465612 .168020 .630000
TA (-4.99) (-11.97) (-23.85) (31.73) (20.50) (36.99)
YC -.014395 -.006025 -.020419 .003653 .001739 .005290
(-9.90) (-3.78) (-18.49) (7.07) (6.02) (8.81)
SD -.008555 .042908 .034353 -.013229 -.002876 -.016106
(-1.70) (7.79) (9.00) (-7.41) (-2.88) (-7.77)
NL .044059 -.050984 -.006925 .007750 .004831 .011817
(9.32) (-9.83) (-1.93) (4.61) (5.14) (6.05)
NC .005353 .018368 .023721 -.017374 .000614 -.016849
(.69) (2.17) (4.04) (-6.32) (.40) (-5.28)
Std. Error
of Estimate .0790 .0867 .0601 .0281 ’ .0157 .0326
R2 .1762 .1532 .3894 .4458 .2559 .5202
R2 .1736 .1505 .3875 .4440 .2535 .5187
F-Ratio 66.50 56.23 198.23 250.03 106.88 337.02 H
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CONSTANT .3792 .4558 .4183 .4521 -.006118 -.006535
(YM-YC) .03027 .01684 -.001074 .01982 — .003443
(8.25) (4.24) (-.10) (1.64) — (.15)
(YP-YC) — — .03843 -.003659 -.006230 -.006606
(2.98) (-.26) (-7.25) (-2.52)
R -.2320 -.5405 -.2234 -.5143 .171327 .1713
TA (-5.33) (-11.46) (-5.13) (-11.45) (19.42) (19.38)
SD .001525 .03393 .0009769 .03398 -.002247 -.002242
(.28) (5.78) (.18) (5.79) (-2.05) (-2.04)
NL .05021 -.05775 .05032 -.05776 .005913 .005913
(10.12) (-10.74) (10.17) (-10.74) (5.89) (5.88)
NC .005104 .01630 .005190 .01629 .000699 .0006978
(.66) (1.95) (.67) (1.94) (.45) (.45)
Std. Error of Est. .0784 .0849 .0782 .0849 .0159 .0159
R2 .1825 .1590 .1878 .1591 .2793 .2793
R2 .1795 .1560 .1842 .1554 .2767 .2761
F-Ratio 61.35 51.96 52.90 43.29 . 106.48 88.68
APPENDIX IV-6
OLS ESTIMATES USING DIFFERENTIAL SLOPES AND INTERCEPTS FOR CANADIAN FIRMS
Dependent Variables











































































































Std. Error of 
Estimate .0783 .0859 .0598 .0272 .0156 .0316 co CO
APPENDIX IV-6 Continued













R2 .1026 .1704 .3951 .4822 .2650 . 5511
R2 .1884 .1661 .3920 .4795 .2612 .5488
F-Ratio 46.24 39.81 126.63 180.52 69.91 238.06
APPENDIX IV-7
CROSS-SECTIONAL/TIME-SERIES REGRESSIONS INCORPORATING 
AN ADJUSTMENT FOR FIRST ORDER AUTOCORRELATION
Dependent Variable • B _ — t B»1S TA r TA i aXH. lagged
Independent 
Variables r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 0.8 r = 0.9 r = 1.0
CONSTANT .470193 .229478 .086889 .0418598 -.001030

















































Std. Error of Est. .0772 .0397 .0207 .6172 .0170
R2 .1742 .1459 .0650 .0288 .0503
R2 .1710 .1426 .0613 .0250 .0466
F-Ratio 54.08 43.80 17.82 7.59 13.58
APPENDIX IV-7—Continued
M MDependent Variable is - r(ma")TA 1A lagged
Independent 
Variables r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 0.8 r = 0.9 r = 1.0
CONSTANT .513580 .258231 .099265 .045962 -.004361
R 











-.007835 -.009021 -.007966 -.005865 -.0026920
YC - rY^lagged (-4.62) (-6.08) (-6.78) (-5.37) (-2.38)
SD .034414 .017283 .006664 .003304 .0006835
(5.71) (5.61) (4.39) (2.79) (.63)
NL -.056895 -.027714 -.010110 -.004247 .0014815
(-10.32) (-9.75) (-6.85) (-3.53) (1.28)
NC .017735 .010414 .006021 .004480 .0028160
(2.06) (2.35) (2.62) (2.38) (1.56)
Std. Error of Est. .0841 .0434 .0225 .0184 .0177
R2 .1625 .1615 .1257 .0-845 .0580
R2 .1592 .1582 .1223 .0809 .0543
F-Ratio 49.75 49.39 36.87 23.66 15.59
APPENDIX TV-1—Continued
MD ro
F FDependent Variable is —t- - r(=x-)TA TA lagged
Independent 
Variables r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 0.8 r = 0.9 r = 1.0
CONSTANT .983772 .487709 .186154 .087822 -.005366
R ,_R.TA " r(TA\agged -.791587 -.769103 -.682307 -.608968 .561286(-22.14) (-20.93) (-17.46) (-15.35) (-14.51)







































Std. Error of Est. .0626 .0342 .0201 .03-71 .0159
R2 .3816 .3576 .2586 .1923 .1588
R2 .3792 .3551 .2557 .1892 .1555
F-Ratio 158.20 142.71 89.43 61.05 48.39 
______________ i
APPENDIX IV-7—Continued
Dependent Variable is - r(^-)
TA TA lagged
Independent 
Variables r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 0.8 r = 0.9 r = 1.0
CONSTANT -.036747 -.017663 -.006143 -.0022946 .0016447
R ,_R.TA * rlTA', .lagged
.511343 .533990 .610680 .6571892 .6761281
(31.68) (30.71) (28.31) (27.35) (26.80)































Std. Error of Est. .0283 .0162 .0111 .0104 .0104
R2 .4922 .4661 .4044 .3844 .3785
R2 .4902 .4640 .4020 .3820 .3761
F-Ratio 248.53 223.81 174.05 160.13 156.15 >K -- i
APPENDIX IV-7—Continued
vo
Dependent Variable is - rS)TA 'TA;iagged
Independent 
Variables r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 0.8 r = 0.9 r = 1.0
CONSTANT -.0158882 -.007184264 -.0009129 .0005874 .0003664
R R. .1775862 .170788701 .1176418 .0674097 .0261417TA (TA lagged (19.21) (17.27) (10.37) (5.71) (2.28)
YC - rYCla d .0020359 .001816931 .0009304 .0001656 -.0005929
(6.24) (5.77) (3.05) (.55) (-1.97)
SD -.0021574 -.000345510 .0012284 .0015631 .0012543
(-1.86) (-.53) (3.12) (4.77) (4.31)
NL .0060298 .002974926 .0010211 .0003816 -.0001362
(5.69) (4.94) (2.67) (1.15) (-.44)
NC .0005893 .000002847 -.0003746 -.0004301 -.0003864
(.36) (.003) (-.63) (-.83) (-.80)
Std. Error of Est. .0162 .0092 .0058 .0051 .0047
R2 .2801 .2440 .1230 .0625 .0314
R2 .2773 .2410 .1196 .0589 .0276
F-Ratio 99.77 82.74 35.96 17.10 8.31
APPENDIX IV-7—Continued
Dependent Variable is IS _ r(TS) TA kTA;lagged
Independent 
Variables r = 0.0 r = 0.5 r = 0.8 r = 0.9 r = 1.0




















































Std. Error of Est. .0328 .0186 .0125 .0115 .0114
R2 .5673 .5396 .4445 .3915 .3612
R2 .5656 .5378 .4424 .3891 .3587
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